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Abstract  
 
This project investigates the EU as a provider of security outside the EU. As an example, we chose 
to analyse, why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the Central African Republic. Our analysis 
is grounded in a securitization framework and therefore focusses on how the conflict in the Central 
African Republic has been constructed as a problem within an EU context. To operationalise the 
analysis we utilised Kingdon’s “Three Stream Model”, which provided a more comprehensive 
understanding of why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the Central African Republic. Our 
main findings were: 1) several securitizing actors managed to move the conflict in the CAR from 
being a condition to being a problem with speech acts constructing the conflict as a security 
problem within the context of the EU. 2) The institutional framework of the CSDP and the CFSP 
created a platform where the decision to intervene militarily in the Central African Republic was 
technically feasible. 3) The positive attitudes in civil society regarding military interventions with 
reference to humanitarian concerns established a context where the EU’s decision to intervene 
militarily was made possible. Consequently, the three streams formed a policy window where the 
adoption of the decision to intervene militarily in the Central African Republic was made possible 
in the end.         
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem Area 
After World War II, there was a desire to prevent future conflicts on the European continent, and 
consequently this desire led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951. In many ways, the European Coal and Steel Community from its inception provided security 
internally.1 Consequently, Europe was transformed “from a ‘conflict formation’ into a security 
community”.2 The economic cooperation among the Member States of the European Coal and Steel 
Community created interdependency, which thus acted as a facilitator for peace.3   
Even though “the EU has all along been motivated by the desire for peace”4, this desire did not 
lead the European Union (EU) being a security provider outside the EU until the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1991.5 The EU has traditionally provided security by humanitarian assistance and development 
aid6, however it is not until recently that it has engaged in the provision of security by military 
means outside the EU.7  
The original reluctance to provide security beyond its own borders was anchored in one of the 
dominant paradigms dictating the dynamic of the international order since the Peace of Westphalia 
in 1648, which regarded “…the legitimate use of violence as being the domain of the modern state, 
which, as a natural consequence, delegitimizes non-state providers of security.”8 Therefore, 
associating the European Union (EU) with the provision of security outside the EU by military 
means would have been unfathomable just a few years back, and continues to provoke raised 
eyebrows.9  
The UK and many other Member States have maintained that a willingness to provide security 
outside the EU by military means would imply things about the EU’s ‘stateness’ that neither they, 
nor their citizens were prepared to accept. However, the tragic events in Yugoslavia invoked a 
                                                          
1 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006) ”The European Union as a Global Actor: EU as Development and Humanitarian 
Actor”, Rothledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon p. 189.  
2 Møller, B. (2005) ”The EU As A Security Actor”, DIIS Report 2005:12, p. 23.  
3 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 163-164.  
4 Møller, B. (2005), p. 23.  
5 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 167. 
6 European Union (2014) ”Humanitarian aid & civil protection”, accessed at: http://europa.eu/pol/hum/index_en.htm  
7 Møller, B. (2005), p. 27.  
8 Manderup, T. (2012) ”Privatisation of Security: The Concept Its History and Its Contemporary Applications” Royal 
Danish Defence College, p. 8.  
9 Schmidt, J. R. (2012) ”The European Union as an Emerging International Military Actor and its Legal Relationship 
with the UN Security Council Resolutions”, University of Edinburgh, p. 101. 
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change in the EU’s position on providing security outside the EU. From the late 1990s, significant 
developments were made in formulating a more decisive common security and defence policy in the 
EU. Consequently, in December 1998, French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair 
agreed at St. Malo, that: “The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in 
order to respond to international crisis.”10 The St. Malo declaration was a landmark reversal of a 
long-standing British position that such an ability under no circumstances should exist 
independently from NATO.11 In 1999, at the Cologne Council, the EU’s role as a security provider 
outside the EU was confounded furthermore in the Petersberg Tasks.12  
These developments in the EU’s institutional framework regarding security and defence, took place 
in an international environment where conflicts, such as the ones in Rwanda and Somalia, had 
emphasised the need for international action in the face of gross human rights abuses and the large-
scale loss of life. In 2001, the ICISS issued the report “The Responsibility to Protect” stressing that 
the international community had a responsibility to intervene in conflicts where a sovereign state 
had failed to meet its responsibility of protecting its own population. This change in the discourse 
regarding state sovereignty also invoked a change in the EU’s role as a security provider outside the 
EU. The EU’s previous unwillingness, or unpreparedness, to respond “…adequately to 
humanitarian crises, in particular when they involved the large-scale loss of life, raised other, 
equally valid questions about the practical, political and ethical consequences of such a standpoint. 
Should the defence of the values at the core of the EU’s Treatises be subject to a geographical 
limit?”13 The confluence of international crisis during the 1990s, and subsequently the international 
community’s inadequate response, pressured the EU into developing its defence dimension.14 It was 
acknowledged that a more robust crisis management approach in the early stages of the 
Yugoslavian conflict would “have been preferable to the EU’s exclusively civilian efforts.”15  
Consequently, to this date the EU has engaged in nine crisis management missions of a military 
nature.16 These missions include the military operation to the former Yugoslav Republic of 
                                                          
10 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006) p. 198. 
11 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006) p. 198. 
12 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006) p. 199. 
13 Claesson, P. (2006) “Defining a new UN approach to the ends, ways and means of military interventions: a 
framework for the European Union”, Subcommittee on Security and Defence p. 3.  
14 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 190. 
15 Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. (2006), p. 191.  
16European External Action Service – “Completed Missions and Operations” http://eeas.europa.eu and “Ongoing 
Missions and Operations” http://eeas.europa.eu  
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Macedonia launched on March 31st 2003, the civilian-military operation in support of the African 
Union's enhanced Mission to Sudan / Darfur, AMIS launched on July 18th 2005, and the EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA launched on January 28th 2008.17 In this way, the EU has shown “a willingness to go 
(…) ‘out-of-area’”18 when providing security by military means.  On the 1st of April 2014, the 
Council of the European Union announced that it had launched an operation in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), EUFOR RCA, making it the 10th operation of where the EU acted as a security 
provider outside the EU by utilising military means with reference to humanitarian concerns.19 This 
was the first operation solely focussed on providing security in the Central African Republic by 
military means. Contrary to operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA launched on January 28th 2008, which 
had as its objective to prevent the crisis in Darfur from spilling over, the EUFOR RCA mission in 
the CAR only aims at creating stability and security within the CAR by military means. 
Consequently, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission had both military and civilian objectives20, whereas 
the EUFOR RCA mission only has military objectives.21   
These considerations have led us to the following problem formulation:  
1.2 Problem Formulation 
 
Why did the EU make decide to intervene militarily in the CAR during the 
spring of 2014? 
 
In order to structure our analysis, the following research questions will be answered: 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
1) How did the current conflict in the CAR evolve from being a condition to being a problem 
in the context of the EU? 
 
2) How did the institutional framework enable the technical feasibility of the decision to 
intervene militarily in the CAR?  
 
3) How have the attitudes of civil society within the EU influenced the EU’s decision to 
intervene militarily in the CAR?  
                                                          
17 European External Action Service ”Completed missions and operations”  
18 Møller, B. (2005), p. 33.  
19 Council of the European Union (Brussels, April 1st 2014) “EU military operation in the Central African Republic 
launched.”  
20 European External Action Service (2014) “Mission Description: EUFOR Tchad/RCA” http://www.eeas.europa.eu  
21 European External Action Service (2014) “EUFOR RCA” http://eeas.europa.eu  
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1.4 Military Interventions and the EU as a security provider 
1.4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at establishing the context within which the EU has evolved as a security 
provider. Firstly, we will in the beginning of the chapter give a brief historical introduction to the 
development of military interventions. This will be utilised in the second part of this chapter, 
where we will establish the EU as a security provider outside the EU by stating that it has 
developed in a broader context of developments in military interventions.  
Before investigating the development of military interventions and the evolvement of EU as a 
security provider outside the EU, we deem it relevant to define security. We ascribe to a broad 
definition of security, and would argue that it is not sufficient to only consider security as the 
absence of  military threats from another states. Rather, the concept of security can also involve the 
security “of human collectives and individuals.”22 Besides the direct insecurities arising from in the 
face of war, we understand insecurity as including situations where the survival and quality of life 
of human beings is at risk.23 Consequently, when providing security, the EU is not only concerned 
for the internal stability of a state, but also the protection and security of human beings. Therefore, 
when the EU provides development aid and humanitarian assistance, it consequently acts as a 
security provider.  
 
1.4.2 Development of military interventions 
The principle of state sovereignty was established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which 
ended the 30-year war on the European continent.24 The Peace of Westphalia introduced the modern 
state-system, in which states “are in law all perfectly equal”25, and there was a belief that a 
sovereign should not be under any higher authority when it came to external relations.26 The Peace 
of Westphalia can be seen as “being the first of several attempts to establish something resembling 
world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammelled sovereignty over certain territories and 
                                                          
22 Møller, B. (2008) ”European Security: The Role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe” 
Regional and Global Axes of Conflict Working Paper 30 p. 16 
23 Møller, B. (2008) p. 16 
24 Anghie, A. (2010) “Basic Principle of International Law: A Historical Perspective” in Basak Çali (2010) 
”International Law for International” Oxford University Press p. 50 
25 Rowen, H.H. (1961) “The Peace of Westphalia Revisited” The Journal of Modern History Vol. 33, No. 1 p. 54 
26 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 53 
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subordinated to no earthly authority.”27 States therefore enjoyed territorial integrity, preventing 
external actors from interfering in internal affairs. Subsequently, the state was the sole provider of 
security within its territorial boundaries. Consequently, “the state became more consolidated, the 
centre of absolute power”28 with the Peace of Westphalia. 
The next attempt to create unity on the European continent started with the Congress of Vienna in 
1815.29 The Vienna Congress introduced the concept of “balance of power”30 With this concept, a 
new political order dawned where states could combine their capabilities against revisionist states.31 
The concept “balance of power” can be seen as an example of great cooperation between European 
states because it introduced the possibility of deterring conflict on the European continent by 
pooling capabilities. In this way, if a state decided to start a conflict: “…it ran the risk of facing a 
formidable enemy made up of several opposing states intent on re-establishing a stable balance.”32 
This created a very flexible system, in which the European states could cooperate if they desired. In 
the beginning this flexibility was praised33, however it is also seen as the reason why cooperation on 
the European continent failed when it was needed the most, and the result was World War I.34  
In this project, we understand the concept of “balance of power” as an important driver of state 
cooperation in Europe within the field of security and defence, because it showed that cooperation 
was possible, although it failed to prevent the subsequent devastation of Europe.   
 
In the aftermath of World War I, there was an imperative wish to create “a new system of 
international order that would seek to prevent such a catastrophe from ever recurring.”35 The result 
of this wish was the creation of the League of Nations, which can be seen as the first international 
institution dedicated to preserve international peace and security, and consequently it was the first 
attempt to “coordinate the behaviour of states through an international actor that possessed its own 
legal personality.”36 The main goal of the League of Nations was to work for collaboratory 
                                                          
27 Gross, L. (1948) “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, NO. 1, 
p. 20 
28 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 53 
29 Gross, L. (1948) p. 20 
30 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 54 
31 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 54 
32 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 55 
33 Gross, L. (1948) p. 20 
34 Gross, L. (1948) p. 20 
35 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 57 
36 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 57 
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international peace and security instead of only focusing on the interests of individual states. 
However, “it could do little unless those states agreed among themselves on a particular course of 
action”37 which implied that it continued to be the prerogative of the state to decide whether to 
cooperate or not. As commonly known, the League of Nations was not able to hinder the start of 
World War II, and as a consequence “the League was doomed.”38 Even though the League of 
Nations failed to prevent World War II, it was another important attempt to create cooperation 
between sovereign states. After World War II, another attempt was made to construct an 
international organisation with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The main objective 
of the League of Nations successor was to promote peace and security, and subsequently to prevent 
states from using armed force “save in the common interest.”39 The United Nations continues to be 
an arena where the member states can develop “international co-operative policies.”40  
In this international context, where cooperation between sovereign states was emphasised, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established. The organisation that we now know 
as the EU can be traced back to the ECSC, and “the history of European integration, as it is 
conventionally understood today, essentially begins in 1945.”41 The development of the EU and the 
UN will not be introduced any further. Nevertheless, the creation of these two institutions 
established the possibility of cooperating in structured international fora.  
After 1945, the world experienced a surge in military interventions aimed at supporting self-
determination.42  The UN General Assembly strengthened this trend by passing a number of 
resolutions lending legitimacy to the struggle for self-determination carried out by national 
liberation movements across especially the African continent.43 The spike in interventions 
supporting self-determination meant a decline in the colonialist pattern of intervention and 
expansionism, and it was no longer considered legitimate by the international community to apply 
force against a sovereign state because of economic interests.44  
                                                          
37 Anghie, A. (2010) p. 57 
38 Gross, L. (1948) p. 21 
39 UN Charter, Preamble, http://www.un.org  
40 Hotz, A.J. (1961) “The United Nations Since 1945: An Appraisal” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 336, p. 127 
41 Cini, M. & Nieves, P-S.B. (2013) “European Union Politics” Oxford University Press 4th edition p. 12 
42 Ortega, M. (2001),”Military Intervention and the European Union”, in: Chaillot Paper, nr. 45: Institute for Seurity 
Studies Western European Union. p. 11. 
43 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 11. 
44 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 12. 
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Between 1945 and 1990, the majority of military interventions were grounded in a “Cold War 
pattern of intervention.”45 Interventions, often carried out by the United States (US) and the Soviet 
Union, were justified on the grounds of ideology. As President Truman in 1947 proclaimed, “At 
the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of 
life.”46 Truman believed every nation had to decide between either the liberal western ideology or 
the communist eastern ideology.47 The Cold War also bore witness to a range of interventions 
based on the principle of self-defence. If a state felt threatened by the possible spill-over effects 
from a civil war in a neighbouring state, then that state could justify an intervention as an act of 
self-defence.48 The principle of self-defence came to be the most-referred-to principle during the 
Cold War when justifying a military intervention.49  
 
Military interventions on the grounds of ideology, self-determination and, especially, self-defence, 
are in this project understood as being the main drivers of the Cold War pattern of military 
intervention. The preamble of the United Nations Charter focusses especially on human rights, for 
instance by declaring that the UN will work towards achieving equal rights for all human beings.50 
However, we argue that these types of military interventions, anchored in a Cold War pattern, 
were essentially based on the self-interest of states because the main incentive for intervening was 
either ideology, self-determination, self-defence of the state.   
In the early 1990s, there was a change to the international order, which can be attributed to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and second, to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.51 The Security Council 
passed resolutions condemning Iraq’s act of aggression, and it was generally agreed among the 
member states of the UN that multilateral action was preferable to unilateral action.52 The few 
military interventions that occurred after 1990 were justified on the grounds of humanitarian 
concerns instead of national interests, which was the case previously.53 These developments 
brought on a change to the understanding of the legalistic principles outlined in the United Nations 
                                                          
45 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 8.  
46 Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947), Avalon Project. Accessed at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu  
47 Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) 
48 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 12.  
49 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 12. 
50 UN Charter, Preamble 
51 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 13.  
52 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 13. 
53 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 13. 
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Charter, which had previously  been covered by the principle of non-intervention. These changes 
included the introduction of the principles: 1) collective intervention, which recognised the right of 
the United Nations Security Council to intervene forcefully within states of peril. And 2) the 
principle of limited intervention, which allowed military intervention by states in other states as a 
reaction to grave instances of human rights abuses.54 These new modes of intervening militarily 
are interesting when investigating the context in which the EU has developed as a security 
provider outside the EU. These modes of intervening militarily institutionalised the idea of 
multilateralism as well as military interventions justified by humanitarian concerns. The use of 
military force for humanitarian reasons can essentially be seen as a redefinition of the norm of 
state sovereignty55, where state sovereignty essentially becomes a responsibility. This essentially 
implies that the “existence of a higher authority capable of holding supposed sovereigns 
accountable”56 when failing to protect its own population, and that higher authority should place 
“the common good ahead of the national interests of its member ships.”57 This redefinition is 
essential for understanding the development of the EU as a security provider outside the EU. As 
will be shown in the section on EU as a security provider, the EU is currently working towards 
creating stability and security beyond its border through the institutional framework of the CSDP 
in states that do not or cannot live up to the responsibility of state sovereignty.  
We argue that this shift was further institutionalised with the principle of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), which was agreed upon in 2005 by the United Nations General Assembly.58 The principle 
of R2P has become “the working language of international engagement with grave humanitarian 
crises”59, but there have been problems forging consensus on the R2P principle.60 The main 
problem with the R2P is the “confusion about the relationship between R2P and non-consensual 
military interventions.”61 Although there are discussions surrounding the principle of R2P, it has 
been widely recognised that the principle legitimises military interventions with reference to 
humanitarian concerns in non-consensual states.62 This recognition is relevant when investigating 
                                                          
54 Ortega, M. (2001), p. 13. 
55 Weiss & Daws: “The Oxford Handbook on the UN” Oxford University Press p. 8 
56 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention” Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-, Vol. 84, No. 4, p. 620 
57 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 620 
58 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 615 
59 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 615 
60 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 616 
61 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 616 
62 Bellamy, A.J. (2008) p. 616 
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the EU’s actions as a security provider outside the EU, because it shows that the EU aligned itself 
with the idea of justifying military interventions with reference to humanitarian concerns.  
The two important changes during the 1990s, going from a unilateral approach to a more 
multilateral approach to military interventions, and military interventions based on humanitarian 
concerns rather than self-interest, are identified as important when explaining the context in which 
the EU as a security provider outside the EU developed. The principle of R2P also informed the 
EU’s development as a security provider outside the EU because as described by Kofi Annan in 
1999, when he was the secretary-general of the United Nations, “State sovereignty, in its most 
basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalisation and international 
cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, 
and not vice versa.”63  
The developments noted above are not the only ones significant in regards to military 
interventions. However, the points that have been made in this chapter is deemed relevant in order 
to understand the context in which the EU has developed as a security provider outside the EU.  
 
1.4.3 The EU as a security provider 
Drent (2013) argues that while the development of the EU as a security provider might be 
primarily focused on actions of the EU, it is important to also investigate the institutional 
architecture of the EU, consequently because it is that same institutional architecture that makes 
external action possible.64 The Council meeting in December 2013 was the first time that defence 
and security issues were to be discussed since 2008.65 In preparation for the Council on Defence 
meeting, both the report from the High Representative and the Commissions Communication had 
defined the EU as a security provider.66 The EU is to be seen as a security provider outside the 
EU, both in terms of providing development aid and humanitarian assistance, but also in terms of 
crisis management and conflict prevention by military means. As argued by Drent (2013), 
institutions matter, and this project argue that the EU has the institutional framework for being a 
security provider. The actual institutional framework will be introduced in the chapter Policy 
                                                          
63 The Economist (1999) “Two Concepts of Sovereignty” Article by Kofi Annan.  http://www.economist.com  
64 Drent, M. (2013) “If Security Matters, Institutions Matter” in Sven Biscop & Daniel Fiott (eds) “The State of Defence 
in Europe: State or Emergency” The Royal Institute for International Relations  p. 82 
65 Watanabe, L. (2013) “Debating European Defence and Security” CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 143, p. 1 
66 Drent, M. (2013) p. 79 
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Stream, while this chapter will be more focused on the overall development of the EU as a security 
provider.  
 
The establishment of peace and security has since the beginning of the European project been a 
fundamental ambition.67 After two world wars on the European continent there was a wish to 
move towards creating “a more peaceful and stable European environment.”68 Although some 
might argue differently, it was commonly believed that it was crucial to move towards political 
and economic cooperation instead of competition, which was thought to be one of the main 
reasons behind the wars of the European nation states.69 Security has often been understood as 
being the “defence against an outside threat of massive armed forces.”70 In line with this, it can be 
argued that the EU was originally created in order to create stability and avoid conflict on the 
European continent, because it was believed that political and economic interdependence on the 
European continent would naturally create peace. However, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty, 
which was signed in 1992, that the EU formulated an actual Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which established the EU as a security provider outside the EU, and which can be seen as 
a move towards establishing a common position within the EU on military interventions.71 
In the two decades that have passed since the creation of the CFSP, the “European Union has 
created separated policies, institutions and capacities for external and internal security.”72 
However, during the last 20 years, the world’s security environment has changed considerably, 
and it is no longer possible to clearly distinguish between internal and external security. The 
creation of the CSDP as an institution dealing with external threats can be seen together with 
Europe’s responses to conflicts in Africa. As argued by Drent, Homan and Zandee (2013), 
conflicts in other areas of the world can have spillover effects, and consequently affect Europe 
negatively.73 During the last 10 years, illegal immigration, terrorism, international crime, and 
illegal trade originating from among other places Africa have been identified as threats to the 
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security of Europe.74 Consequently, “promoting development and good governance is in the 
interest of the international community as a whole since it will help prevent local conflicts and 
insecurity from spilling over.”75 Therefore, local insecurities, in for example Africa, that threatens 
the internal stability of Europe, is relevant in the context of the development of external and 
internal security policies.  
After the Cold War, and in the face of the conflicts in the Balkans, the EU “identified the need for 
viable and synchronised crisis management structures and felt obliged to engage more directly in 
conflict prevention and crisis management.”76 It could therefore be argued that the development of 
the CSDP, and with it the European crisis management structures, was a consequence of two 
things: 1) external threats started to be seen as potential threats to the EU security due to spillover 
effects, and 2) the EU feels obliged to act as a security provider outside the EU. This necessitated 
the construction of the institutional framework that could make military intervention based upon 
humanitarian concerns possible, because, as Drent (2013) argues, the institutional architecture is 
what makes action possible.  
 
As described in the beginning of this section, the creation of the EU was originally a peace project 
aiming at establishing stability and security on the European continent. However, the EU has 
developed into a security provider not only within the EU, but also externally. As was explicitly 
stated by the Commission in 2001, the EU “now seeks to project stability also beyond its own 
borders.”77 Consequently, during the last twenty years the EU has developed as a security 
provider, by developing an institutional framework and with it a crisis management approach, 
which enables the provision of security outside the EU.78   
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2. Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
Within this chapter, we will present our theoretical framework. First, the backbone of our 
theoretical framework, securitization, will be presented by aligning the concept with the 
Copenhagen School. Second, we will explain why we have chosen to support securitization (as a 
theoretical framework established by the Copenhagen School) with the notions about securitization 
presented by Theirry Balzacq.  
 
2.2 The Copenhagen School 
The overall analytical and theoretical framework utilised within this project is securitization. The 
framework was first developed and transferred as a concept into the field of security-studies, by the 
so-called Copenhagen School. In their 1998 publication “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde developed the cornerstone of the Copenhagen School and 
securitization. Securitization theory builds upon a mixture of theories of international relations, as 
well as language theory, and focuses mainly on questions like “what counts as a security problem? 
Why do certain challenges become security issues while other do not?”79 Securitization is 
essentially a process – an intersubjective process. A process where a securitizing actor via a speech 
act declares a particular “…issue, dynamic or actor”80 a existential threat to a referent object.81 The 
presence of an existential threat legitimises a breach of existing rules and consequently a 
“…suspension of normal politics”.82 According to Ole Wæver, “…security is not of interest as a 
sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act”83 Therefore, by speaking the 
word “security”, or any words related to the security discourse, a securitizing actor constructs 
security by an utterance. This utterance is the speech act, which not only “speaks” of security, but 
also at the same time constructs the meaning of security. In this way, speech acts are not only 
linguistic acts that describe reality, but also acts that actively change and construct reality. 
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A referent object can take many forms. Traditionally, a referent object was the state84, however, a 
referent object can be any “…state, nation, civilization, or some other larger community, principle, 
or system”85 that have a legitimate claim for survival.86 An existential threat is therefore 
“something” that threatens the referent object’s legitimate claim to survival.87 The securitizing actor 
is an agent that articulates the importance of treating the existential threat with extraordinary 
means.88 Whether or not the threat is “real” is not of importance. Rather, it is important how the 
speech act establishes a shared understanding of the existential threat. Thereby, the securitizing 
actor via the speech act constructs a sense of urgency and a need to protect the referent object from 
the existential threat. However, for the securitization process to be successful, an audience must be 
able to recognise and relate to the speech act – the intersubjective character of the process.89 The 
audience therefore has an important role in the process of securitization – an issue is securitized 
“…only if and when the audience accepts it as such”.90 The speech act is also referred to as the 
securitizing move.91 It is the speech act that linguistically constructs the existential threat as a threat. 
It is the tool, whereby the securitizing actor attempts to convince the audience to accept its 
articulation of the threat. The speech act does therefore not only constitute a representation or a 
preference of how to view the world, it has a “performative effect”92 in that the speech act creates 
and constructs the threat. Thereby, the linguistic enunciation of an existential threat as a threat, 
establishes it as a threat – essentially “saying is doing”.93 
 
2.3 Balzacq and Securitization 
The above notions about securitization is the backbone of the Copenhagen School. These notions 
are fundamental when utilising a securitization framework, and later scholars of securitization all 
rest upon these notions. However, within this project we will not utilize the model of securitization 
as described by the Copenhagen School; rather, our framework will have as its base the pragmatic, 
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sociological model of securitization developed by Thierry Balzacq (2011). Utilising Balzacq’s 
notions on securitization will enable us to open up the theoretical framework and broaden the 
analytical objects of securitization. Choosing Balzacq as a foundation for the theoretical analysis 
makes it possible to utilise a different method than usually when employing a securitization 
framework. Subsequently, we have in order to operationalise our analysis of why the EU made the 
decision to intervene with military means in the conflict in the CAR in 2014, chosen to apply the 
“three stream model” developed by Kingdon (1984). Our chosen method will be presented in the 
method chapter.  
Balzacq has three basic assumptions about securitization: “… (i) that an effective securitization is 
audience-centred; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is 
power-laden”94. Balzacq thereby clearly distinguishes his theoretical approach to securitization 
from that of the Copenhagen School. Instead of focusing on the speech act as a separate and single 
object of analysis in studying the process of securitization, it is important to include the 
“surroundings” of the speech act. Securitization therefore has to be seen as a “pragmatic act”95 
which consists of an agent and act level. The agent level includes the “power position”96  and 
“social identity”97 of the securitizing actor, as well as the “…nature and the capacity of the target 
audience”98. On the act level, two facets prevail; the nature of the language itself, and the 
contextual side of the language – that is the linguistic means the securitizing actor utilizes to 
mobilise the audience.99 
Balzacq refers to his own approach to securitization as sociological, and subsequently labels the 
Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization as philosophical.100  According to Balzacq, when 
adopting a sociological approach to securitization, the process of securitization needs to be analysed 
with the three basic assumptions, namely “…including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition 
of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”101 Balzacq 
also argues that the sociological view builds on Bourdieu in that there is a focus on agents 
mediating performative actions, which are situated within a “…set of dispositions that inform their 
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perceptions and behaviours”102, also known as habitus. Both the philosophical and sociological 
approach include the importance of the audience; however, according to Balzacq, the sociological 
approach emphasises the “…mutual constitution of securitizing actors and audience”103, and 
therefore the audience is not to be seen as a constituted entity. Balzacq does not believe that simply 
uttering a speech act changes the social context. It takes more than simply announcing that “X” is a 
threat. Rather, “... security statement must, usually, be related to an external reality”.104 Therefore, 
the articulation of a threat is not enough to securitize an object; there needs to be resonance with the 
context of the utterance. Furthermore, Balzacq relates this to his notion of institutional and brute 
threats.105 Where institutional threats are the product of a security articulation, brute threats are 
“real” in that these threats do not need linguistic mediation to be a threat; they simply are threats 
(e.g. earthquakes). This distinction is important as it illustrates “how far” linguistic manipulation of 
the referent object can go. There is a limit to how and what can be securitized; simply, according to 
Balzacq, “… language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it”106. 
Subsequently, the securitizing actor’s ability to align the object of securitization with the external 
reality is highly important for the success of the process. The audience must be able to relate the 
security utterance to the context, and consequently, “… when the concept of “security” is used, it 
forces the audience to “look around” in order to justify the conditions (the presumed threats) that 
justifies its articulation”107. In this way, the context is of high importance when determining the 
success of a securitization process. 
  
                                                          
102 Balzacq, T. (2011) p. 2 
103 Balzacq, T. (2011) p. 2 
104 Balzacq, T. (2005), p. 182 
105 Balzacq, T. (2005), p. 181 
106 Balzacq, T. (2005), p. 181 
107 Balzacq, T. (2005), p. 182 
20 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Introduction 
As introduced briefly in the theory chapter, this project will use Kingdon’s “three stream model” to 
operationalise our analysis and to track the process of securitization in relation to the EU decision to 
intervene militarily in the CAR in 2014. In the following, we will explain how we intend to 
operationalise Kingdon’s “three stream model” and subsequently outline our analytical strategy. 
First, we will introduce the framework of Kingdon’s model, second we will outline the three 
different streams, and thirdly we will give an explanation as to how the three streams interlink as 
well as an explanation of the concept ‘policy window’ and how the concept interlinks with the three 
streams. Lastly, the analytical strategy of the project will follow.  
 
3.2 The “Three Stream Model” 
Kingdon’s “three streams model” is an analytical tool first developed to show how and why 
political agendas change. In essence, the model aims at discovering why some ideas reach the 
political agenda while others do not. The model consists of three categories: 1) setting the agenda, 
2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is made, and 3) an authoritative choice 
among those alternatives in a legislative procedure.108 Kingdon defines the agenda as “the list of 
subjects or problems to which government officials (…) are paying some serious attention at any 
given time”.109 Kingdon argues that there are three major process streams that can be used to 
explain why policy agendas change, and why some ideas reach the agenda while others fail. These 
three process streams are the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream.110  
Using Kingdon’s model to operationalise the analysis will allow us to discover elements and 
reasons as to why the EU have chosen to use military means in the CAR that we might not have 
found if we had utilised a traditional securitization framework like the one of the Copenhagen 
School. The “three stream model” is essentially a tool to track the development and construction of 
policies, and since the decision to intervene militarily in the CAR is in effect a policy, the 
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operationalization of our analysis by using the “three stream model” is justified. Furthermore, 
utilising the “three streams model” will open up some core concepts in the securitization 
framework, in that the “three streams” reflect the possibility of different settings of securitization, 
and consequently audiences. The different settings and audiences each depict how different logics 
of persuasion and approaches to persuasion is vital for the success of securitization. We will be able 
to discover more than just identifying the referent object and the existential threat. Utilising the 
“three streams model” will give valuable nuances to the analysis, and enable us to take into account 
how a securitization process can be successful. Consequently, the three streams will give three 
different answers as to why the EU intervened militarily in the CAR. 
The following is an introduction to the three streams. A specification of how the three streams are 
applied to the EU in this project will follow later in the analysis. 
 
3.2.1 The problem stream 
In the problem stream, an actor, a securitizing actor, aims at constructing a problem and move it 
onto the agenda.111 Kingdon distinguishes between problems and conditions. Conditions, natural-
disasters, illness, poverty, are not policy problems before an actor construct them as such. It is 
therefore an actor that are responsible for, consciously or unconsciously, formulation the condition 
as a problem. A problem is reminiscent of an existential threat, and it is often the “…existence of 
dramatic events or crises”112 that draw the attention of an actor to a condition and the subsequent 
formulation of the condition as a problem. In addition, Kingdon argues that actors often use 
indicators to identify problems within a specific area, and “indicators can draw the attention of 
decision-makers towards certain problems and therefore define the very essence of them.”113 
It is easy to see how the problem stream relate to the securitization framework. First of all, the fact 
that problem are not problems, they are conditions, in themselves but need an actor, a securitizing 
actor, to construct and formulate the problem. Secondly, the securitizing actor uses external 
dramatic events or crisis to construct the condition as a problem, similar the way the securitizing 
actor uses existential threats in the securitization framework. The securitization process is in 
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essence how a condition as formulated into a problem by an actor, using external events as 
argument for the pressing nature of the problem.  
The audience in the problem stream are decision-makers involved in the agenda-setting process.114 
They need to be convinced of the urgency of the problem, existential threat, and the logic needed to 
persuade them is therefore dependent on the ability of the actor to link the problem with the referent 
object. The understanding of the problem is thus an evolving process, where the interaction and the 
trying to persuade the audience, the follow decision-makers, continue to construct the understanding 
of the problem.  
 
3.2.2 The policy stream 
This stream is focused of the formation of policies, and how a problem becomes a policy.115 There 
can be many problems waiting to reach the agenda and become policies. However, only problems 
that live up to the following criteria:”…technical feasibility, value acceptability for the policy 
community, and successful anticipation of future constraints (such as budget constraint)”116 tend to 
survive and become policies. The different policy alternatives go through what Kingdon argues 
resembles a ´biological natural selection´, where specialists decide the fate of the policy proposal.117 
The specialists are bound by their “…common interest in the policy area”118, and thus make up what 
Kingdon calls “policy communities”. The audience to persuade in the policy stream are therefore 
members of the policy communities – the specialists and technocrats119. They are persuaded by 
logic and arguments based upon “…knowledge, rationality and efficiency”120. Thus, the persuasion 
are deeply dependent on the audience and setting, and it is clear that the arguments needed to 
persuade the policy communities is different from the arguments needed to persuade the audience of 
the two other streams and the general public.121 Therefore, the nature of arguments and language is 
of high importance, seeing as through there are many ways to argue why an existential threat is 
legitimate to tackle.   
                                                          
114 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 66 
115 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 66 
116 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 66 
117 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 66 
118 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
119 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
120 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
121 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
23 
 
3.2.3 The politics stream 
The politics stream is about what influences the adoption of a policy proposal – which factors and 
elements are decisive. Kingdom establishes that elements such as “public mood, pressure groups 
campaigns, election results, ideological distributions in the political institutions, and changes is the 
administration”122 are significant when describing why some policy proposals are adopted and 
others are not. Especially the political mood is identified as a vital aspect of the politics stream.123 
The political mood can be identified as “…the national mood (or the different national moods in the 
EU), the climate in the country, changes is public opinion, or broad social movements.”124 Instead 
of referring to the political mood we will throughout the project refer to it as civil society because it 
better encapsulates notions such as public opinion, the media and NGO’s. The political mood 
establishes why, or why not, policy proposals are adopted, in that it explains the hindrances or 
favourable conditions it exudes. Consequently, changes in the public mood, perhaps brought on by 
the media or NGO’s, and the adaptation by decision-makers to these changes are of great 
significance. Whether decision-makers perceive this mood accurately, is not important, rather “what 
matters is that the perceptions that they collectively hold of the political mood is strong.”125 
The main activity within the politics stream is bargaining, building coalitions and negotiations with 
other relevant actors. Seeing as though the policy proposal has already been discussed within the 
policy stream, some decision-makers may have already conformed and agreed to the proposal, 
while others may not, and therefore “the decision-makers that remain to be convinced will need to 
be given something in return for their support.”126 Building coalitions is vital in ensuring that a 
policy proposal is adopted; especially in democratic settings. Within this stream, the audience is 
compromised of the decision-makers involved in the decision-making process, as well as the 
general public.127 
 
                                                          
122 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
123 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
124 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
125 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
126 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67 
127 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 68 
24 
 
3.2.4 Policy Windows 
There is an order in which the three streams come; first, a problem is identified and constructed as a 
problem. This process is the object of analysis in the problem stream. Second, the object of analysis 
in the policy stream is the technical feasibility of bringing a problem into a policy. This step is 
mainly focuses on technical experts, bureaucracies and institutional settings. The third step of the 
analysis is focused on the political actors and their struggle for bringing the policy proposal into an 
actual policy. 
This outline shows a hierarchical order of the three streams; the problem stream is analysed first, 
the policy second, and lastly the politics stream. There is a hierarchical order of the three streams, 
however, the three streams work simultaneously and consequently feed into each other.  According 
to Kingdon, when the three streams become coupled they form a policy window. The policy 
window is therefore when policies are adopted. In the policy window:”…a problem is recoqnised 
and a solution has been developed and is available in the policy community, a change in the politics 
stream makes it the right time for overall policy change”128. The policy window is open only for a 
short period of time. The opening of the policy window is a “falling” together of all the factors in 
the three streams necessary for a policy proposal to be adopted.129 These factors change suddenly, 
and consequently the policy window closes again.  
Consequently, a model of the three streams and their interconnection might look like this:   
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Figure 1 - The Three Stream Model 
 
3.3 Analytical strategy  
It is important to bear in mind that our analysis of EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR 
only focuses on the decision – not what happened after EU took the decision to intervene militarily. 
The analysis will therefore not include speculations about what happened after the decision was 
taken by the EU. 
Next will follow our analytical strategy. Our considerations are guided by our chosen theory, as 
well as our chosen method. Our analysis will be structured after Kingdon’s three stream model in 
order to show that EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR can be analysed from three 
different angles, which consequently can give a more nuanced answer to the problem formulation of 
this project. The problem stream can be seen as a typical analysis of a securitization process, and 
the subsequent streams contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of why the EU decided 
to intervene militarily in the CAR.     
Therefore, the analytical strategy has been divided into three points similar to the three streams. 
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3.3.1 Problem Stream 
We will in the analysis of the problem-stream use newspaper articles, press releases and speeches 
addressing the conflict in the CAR to show how the conflict in the CAR has been moved from 
being a condition to being a problem in the context of the EU. The analysis of the problem stream 
will enable our further analysis of the policy-stream by establishing the foundation for 
understanding the policy options that were available to the EU in addressing the conflict in CAR.   
 
3.3.2 Policy Stream 
In the analysis of the policy stream, we will establish the institutional framework of the CFSP and 
the CSDP in order to give a background for the policy communities relevant for securitization of the 
military intervention in the CAR. The establishment of the institutional framework of especially the 
CSDP will help us identify the measures technically feasible within the CSDP.  
In the investigation of the institutional framework of the CSDP, the policy communities, and the 
measures technically feasible, we will apply Kingdon’s notions of the policy stream to different 
kinds of official documents from the EU (e.g. treaty articles), as well as academic literature.  
 
3.3.3 Politics Stream 
The politics stream will be analysed by firstly establishing civil society’s attitudes in regards to the 
EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR. This will be done by investigating surveys 
measuring the population’s of the UK, Germany and France attitudes towards CSDP, as well as 
opinions of political actors. In addition, NGO’s effect on civil society through the media will 
contribute to the analysis.  Consequently, the material analysed in the politics stream will mainly be 
newspaper articles and official statements from prominent actors involved in the decision-making 
process to intervene militarily in the CAR, as well as surveys from Eurobarometer.  
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4. Analysis 
 
4.1 The Problem Stream  
4.1.1 Introduction 
In the following analysis, we will explore how the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
moved from being a “condition” to being a “problem” in the context of the EU. It is important to 
bear in mind that there is a distinction to be made between conditions and problems – bad weather 
and poverty are conditions, which, according to Léonard and Kaunert, only turn into problems if 
“…decision-makers perceive them as such and come to believe that they should be tackled.”130 It 
follows that what is taking place in the CAR does not necessarily constitute a problem in the 
context of the EU. However, the fact remains that the EU has launched a military operation in the 
CAR, and the question therefore becomes: why the EU has felt compelled to respond and engage 
itself in the current conflict in the CAR?  
To answer this question, we will throughout this next chapter, guided by Kingdon’s notion of the 
problem-stream, attempt to retrace the process where the conflict in the CAR went from being a 
“condition” to a “problem” in the context of the EU.  Our main finding in the problem stream is that 
several prominent figures in the EU, including France, acted as securitizing actors constructing the 
conflict in the CAR as a security problem in the context of the EU. Consequently, they succeeded in 
moving the conflict from being a condition to being a problem in the context of the EU, and 
subsequently the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR. The referent object is in the 
analysis established as the population in the CAR, with several speech acts outlining the importance 
of protecting the human security of the population in the CAR. The existential threat is identified as 
twofold – 1) the reoccurring abuse of human rights and crimes against humanity threatening the 
population in the CAR, and 2) the fear of the conflict spilling-over and destabilizing the region. 
Subsequently, the extraordinary measures utilised by the EU to combat the existential threat is a 
military intervention justified with reference to humanitarian concerns. 
Consequently, in order to structure our analysis of the problem-stream we will identify the 
following; 
1. Who is the referent object?  
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2. What is/are the existential threat(s)? and; 
3. What are the extraordinary measures? 
By identifying these three categories, we will be able to determine the process of securitization 
whereby the conflict in the CAR turned into a security problem in the context of the EU.  
    
Before we set out to determine how the situation in the CAR went from being a condition to a 
problem in the context of the EU, we will give a brief overview of the conditions of the conflict in 
the CAR in order to present the context of the current conflict in the CAR. As Balzacq establishes, 
in order for the securitization to be successful, the securitizing actor must be able to align the 
referent object with the context.131 Therefore, in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the 
securitization process we must provide the context of the current conflict in the CAR. 
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4.1.2 Historical overview of the Central African Republic 
This section will entail a brief introduction, with an emphasis on the last 30 years, of the social and 
political situation in the Central African Republic (CAR).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Map of the Central Africa Republic 
 
The CAR can be seen as an“…extreme example of the lack of viability of a state in general, and 
democracy in particular.”132 Development within the country is restrained by “…the absence of 
government administration throughout much of the country.”133 During the last 20 years, as Mehler 
(2011) argues, the political parties have suffered in the CAR, and there has been a decline in the 
importance of the political parties in the political arena. Since the 1990s, the political situation in 
the CAR can be described as being “…perverted by the undemocratic behaviour of democratically 
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elected rulers.”134 The consequences of the actions of these rulers can be seen as one of the key 
reasons for the mutinies in 1996/97, coup d’état in 2001/2 and the successful rebellion in 2003.135 
According to the International Crisis Group, this “…succession of mutinies and rebellions, which 
have produced a permanent crisis, the government has lost its monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force.”136 Glasius (2008) also discusses the unstable political situation in the CAR, stating 
that“…governance of the Central African Republic has been blighted by personal power struggles 
at the top.”137 A series of ‘cleptocratic’ regimes in the CAR has availed themselves with the 
resources of the country, and at the same time “…embroiling peacefully coexisting ethnic groups in 
competition with one another.”138 During the rebellion in 2003, rape, killing, and intimidation of 
civilians was prevalent, and during 2005-2007, the two rebellions in the northern parts of the 
country were characterised by the burning down of houses by government troops.139  
 
The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005, where Bozizé won the presidential election 
and his party most of the votes, was generally believed to be “…a mandate for Bozizé to carry on 
the policy of national reconciliation he had begun and to jointly work with the other political forces 
towards a stabilisation of the security situation.”140 However, Bozizé did not live up to these hopes, 
and the trust in his government began to deteriorate. About six months after the election, in the 
spring of 2006, armed resistance forces in both the north-western and north-eastern part of the CAR 
established a rebellion against Bozizé’s government.  The rebellion was not stopped until France 
intervened militarily in the country, citing the Defence Accord with the Central African Republic. A 
ceasefire was signed in April 2007, which was adhered to until the beginning of January 2008.141  
After the collapse of the ceasefire, in January 2008, the EU launched its EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
mission. The EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was identified as a “…bridging operation (…) in eastern 
Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic”142 The initiative to launch the mission 
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came from France who argued that the mission was necessary in order to prevent spill-over effects 
from the conflict in Sudan.143 The objectives of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was:  
 to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, 
 to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian 
personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations, and 
 to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities installations and equipment and to 
ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own staff, UN staff and associated 
personnel. 144 
The objectives of the 2008 mission in the CAR clearly establishes that the mission was of 
humanitarian character. The emphasis on “protecting civilians” and “facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid” evidently shows that the EU when justifying the mission aligned itself with a 
discourse of human security. Consequently, although being defined as a military intervention145, the 
mission was “…officially justified as a humanitarian operation.”146 The EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
mission’s was consequently a “…integral element in the EU’s effort to contribute to solving the 
crisis in Darfur.”147  However, “…there is no doubt that the situation the Chadian and CAR refugee 
and IDP camps was dire and that additional humanitarian support from outside agencies was 
required.”148 In this way, even though the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was a response to the 
conditions in the CAR, the objective of the mission was to deter the conflict in Darfur.  
As established, the political and social conditions in the CAR were therefore unstable and harsh; but 
also today the CAR can be described as“… not only one of the poorest countries in the world – it 
also has to bear particular weighty burdens of the past.”149 The political parties within the country 
are losing control over the political system, and conflicts often arise over ethno-graphical issues; 
political parties compete with rebel movements, who also claim to fight for the local grievances, for 
power.150 The conditions in the CAR under which the current conflict has developed can therefore 
be described as being a situation of poverty, distrust in politicians and the political system, and 
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conflicts among the ethnographic groups in the country with political leaders often promoting their 
own ethnographic group.  
 
4.1.2.1 The current crisis in the CAR 
The previous section established that the CAR faced a daunting set of governance, economic, 
social, humanitarian, and security challenges well before the current crisis erupted. Consequently, 
the EU’s 2008 mission, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, was deployed to deal with some of these conditions. 
As will be established, the EU has long before the current crisis been committed to long-term socio-
economic recovery under a comprehensive state- and peacebuilding agenda aimed at building a 
more stable country.151 A rapid implementation of previous peace agreements, combined with a 
debilitating socio-economic climate and the country’s close ties with political instability, led to the 
outbreak of a new conflict in December 2012. Despite attempts, such as the signing of the Libreville 
agreement on January 11th 2013, tensions deepened and culminated with the seizure of power by the 
Seleka rebel groups in March 2013. Violence erupted in the capitol of Bangui when there was a 
“’spike of madness’ on 5 and 6 December when about 1,000 people were killed in the space of those 
two days in the capital.” 152 
Since December 2012, the majority of the population of 4.6 million have been affected by the 
conflict, and more than 50 % of the population are in need of aid. Estimates suggest that as of 
January 31st 2014, more than 825.000 were internally displaced people in the CAR, and more than 
245.000 have sought towards neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the dispersion of humanitarian 
aid has been restricted due to insecurity, which hinders the monitoring of the overall humanitarian 
situation and the delivery of urgently needed relief to those affected by the violence.153  
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4.1.3 The EU as a humanitarian aid donor in the CAR 
The EU has been present in the CAR as one of the country’s main donors since 2001154, providing 
life-saving activities. Since the beginning of 2013, the EU’s aid assistance has amounted to €20.5 
million, and since the current crisis erupted in the CAR, the EU has doubled its team of 
humanitarian experts based in Bangui in order to enable the proper monitoring of the situation.155 It 
is important to keep this in mind, because by noting that the EU was present in the CAR long before 
the current conflict erupted we can establish that humanitarian assistance has so far been the 
standard or “normal” policy in the EU in regards to the CAR.    
The European Commission (Commission) noted as far back as December 8th 2013 that an estimated 
400,000 people had been internally displaced due to the fighting, which ensued following the 
overthrow of Bozizé in March 2013.156  A press release from December 8th 2013 highlighted that 
with €20 million in aid since the beginning of 2013, the Commission was the biggest aid donor in 
the CAR. With this aid, the Commission provided support across a range of sectors including 
protection, access to health care, food and nutrition, drinking-water distribution, sanitation services, 
logistics and humanitarian coordination, as well as catering for the needs of those in dire need due 
to the fighting.157 In the press release from December 8th 2013, as a response to the concern for the 
humanitarian situation in the CAR, the Commission announced that it intended to launched an air 
bridge from Doula in Cameroon. This air bridge was launched in order to open up a vital line of 
support into and out of Bangui, the capital of the CAR, as part of the international community’s 
efforts to stabilize the situation in the conflict-ridden country.158 Another air operation was 
announced on December 12th 2013, providing urgently needed medical assistance to the CAR.159  
In Brussels on December 12th 2013, the spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, the EU High 
Representative, gave a statement on the violence in the CAR, and commented on the United 
Nations Security Council’s adoption of resolution 2127 (2013):  
“The High Representative welcomes the adoption by the United Nations Security 
Council of Resolution 2127 (2013) on the Central African Republic. This 
resolution emphasizes the international community’s commitment to the Central 
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African Republic (…) The resolution responds to the urgency and gravity of the 
situation by providing a mandate under Chapter VII (…) It is essential that 
security be re-established and the civilian population protected. (…)The 
European Union (…) remains firmly committed to helping actively to resolve this 
crisis (…)”160  
This statement makes it clear that the High Representative is paying close attention to how the 
conflict in the CAR is unfolding. This statement is significant because in the capacity as High 
Representative, Catherine Ashton possesses an agenda-setting power, which should not be 
dismissed as insignificant.161 It is also noteworthy to mention the reference to Security Council 
Resolution 2127 (2013) because Ashton thereby indirectly acknowledges, with reference to the UN 
Charter Chapter VII, that military interventions can be effective instruments of crisis management. 
Finally, it is important to take note of the relationship that is drawn up between the re-establishment 
of security and the continuation of development projects, as well as the ability of humanitarian 
organisations to reach those most in need. It is here made clear that a top-priority of the EU is to 
ensure the continuation of its development policy and humanitarian assistance. With this speech act, 
the High Representative constructs the current conflict in the CAR as a security problem in the 
context of the EU. When using phrases such as “…helping actively to resolve the crisis” and 
“…security be re-established and the civilian population protected” the High Representative by her 
uttering moves the conflict in the CAR into a specific discourse – that of security. Furthermore, 
with the phrase “the international community’s commitment to the Central African Republic” the 
High Representative establishes that the security provision in the CAR is a concern of the EU. As 
described in the chapter on the EU as a security provider, the EU, in the face of the conflicts in the 
Balkans and the end of the Cold War, “…felt obliged to engage more directly in conflict prevention 
and crisis management.”162 Consequently, the phrase from the High Representative can be seen as 
an example of doing just that. 
This is also seen in the following statement from a meeting with the Foreign Affairs Council in 
Brussels on December 16th 2013, where the High Representative, Catherine Ashton stressed that: 
“The international community needs to act decisively to stop the crisis from 
deepening further and we very much welcome the French intervention in support 
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of the operation – to which the EU has pledged funding of 50 million euros. We 
have also provided considerable humanitarian assistance.”163 
Similarly, the High Representative taps into the security discourse with this statement. The declared 
support for the French intervention could be seen as an acknowledgement of that humanitarian 
assistance might not be enough to deter the conflict in the CAR.  However, humanitarian assistance 
is still at this point the preferred response to the conflict. The emphasis on the international 
community’s obligation to “act decisively to stop the crisis” again points to an understanding of the 
EU, and the rest of the world, as a provider of security in the CAR.  
 
On December 16th 2013, the Commission announces that it is increasing its humanitarian aid by 
€18.5 million. This is done in order to be able to provide immediate life-saving assistance to those 
suffering in a crisis that has affected a population of 4.6 million.164 Similar to the High 
Representative, the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis 
Response, Georgieva, notes that: 
“The country is facing the worst humanitarian and human rights crisis since its 
independence. The number of internally displaced people has increased 
dramatically in recent days, to over half a million. 230,000 are refugees in 
neighbouring countries. We need to act now by increasing our aid and bring 
relief to those suffering the most”165 
It is in this statement established that the referent object is the population in the CAR who are 
threatened by human rights abuses, which implores the EU “to act now”. This statement, along with 
the statement from the High Representative on December 16th 2013, illustrates how the EU does not 
diverge from its “normal” policy towards the CAR at this point166. Therefore, we argue that the only 
divergence is the size of the humanitarian assistance, which is increased significantly as a way of 
alleviating the consequences brought on by conflict. This additional aid brought the EU’s 
humanitarian assistance to the CAR in 2013 to €39 million, and another €10 million were set aside 
from January 1st 2014 and onwards.167 However, although the EU at this point had only increased 
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its humanitarian assistance to the CAR, EU Commissioners Georgieva and Adris Piebalgs, 
Commissioner for Development, recognised that:  
“Our aid is not enough to stop the suffering of Central African (…). We appeal to 
our international humanitarian and development partners to make a joint effort 
that can make a significant and lasting difference for the country”.168 
Here we get a sense that the EU is ready to suspend its normal policies towards the CAR. It is 
recognised that humanitarian assistance in the form of development aid is “is not enough to stop the 
suffering”. In addition, the emphasis on a “joint effort” to deter the conflict shows again that the EU 
sees itself as a security provider in relation to the CAR.  
In a memo from the Commission on December 30th 2013 EU Commissioner Georgieva stated: 
“The humanitarian tragedy in the Central African Republic continues to unravel 
in front of our eyes. The entire population of 4.6 million people is affected. 
800,000 people are internally displaced. Since early December in the capital 
Bangui alone, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) has grown from 
30,000 to now over 370,000. 230,000 people have sought refuge in neighbouring 
countries, underlining the regional dimension of the disaster.”169  
With the phrase “The entire population of 4.6 million people is affected”, EU Commissioner 
Georgieva emphasises that the referent object is without question the population in the CAR, 
consequently forcing the EU to react.  
At a high-level meeting on the humanitarian crisis in the CAR held in Brussels on January 20th 
2014, aid donors rallied to help the country, which faced a “dramatically deteriorating 
situation”.170 The Commission arranged this meeting together with the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and donors such as the World Bank and the United States 
pledged their support to the CAR, bringing the total support pledged at the meeting to €366 million. 
In connection with the meeting, EU Commissioner Georgieva added:  
“Central Africans are enduring a major humanitarian tragedy and their suffering 
is truly appalling. The international humanitarian community assembled in 
Brussels today is determined to reinforce assistance and provide urgently needed 
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aid to the most vulnerable. The brutality, violence and sectarian nature of the 
crisis concerns us all.”171 
Again, it is established with this statement that the referent object is the “ordinary people in CAR”, 
and the EU has a role to play in deterring the conflict; essentially “the crisis concerns us all”. Both 
these remarks from EU Commissioner Georgieva adds to the understanding that the EU is 
genuinely concerned with the conflict in the CAR, and the effects the conflict has on the population.  
 
In the following statement, also from the Commission memo of December 30th 2013, it becomes 
apparent that the EU considers suspending its normal policies towards the CAR: 
“Ever since the beginning of the current crisis, in March 2013, security and 
protection of civilians have been the primary concern, both for the population of 
CAR and to prevent the crisis spreading to other parts of the region. (…) The 
number of people in need of life-saving assistance is increasing by the hour. Yet, 
humanitarian organisations face enormous difficulties to operate unhindered 
throughout the country. To avoid this tragedy spiralling further out of control, 
now is the time for concerted action. (…) If necessary, there should be an 
increase in the international security presence.”172  
With this statement, it becomes clear that the EU considers suspending its normal policies, which 
has been established earlier as humanitarian assistance. Here, it is emphasised that it “is the time for 
concerted action” and that “there should be an increase in the international security presence.” 
With these phrases, the EU warrants a suspension of its normal policies towards the CAR, justified 
by the concerns for the referent object, “the population of CAR”, but there is also an emphasis on 
“prevent the crisis spreading to other parts of the region”. In this way, a suspension of the EU’s 
normal policies towards the CAR is not only warranted by an existential threat towards the referent 
object, but also by a fear of the conflict in the CAR will spread to the neighbouring countries due to 
the heavy strain of refugees on neighbouring countries, and consequently destabilising the region.  
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4.1.4 France as a securitizing actor 
Statements concerning EU’s role in the CAR up to the point where the EU decided to intervene 
militarily in the CAR mentions France. France has a colonial history with the CAR, and has 
previously engaged itself in the country. France has therefore a prominent role as in pushing the EU 
to intervene militarily in the conflict. This makes France a securitizing actor, which with several 
speech acts played a role in the construction of the conflict in the CAR as important for the EU. 
Some of these speech acts will be shown in the following. 
 
In regards to the announcement on December 12th 2013, where the Commission announced an air 
operation, Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid 
and Crisis Response added:  
"A humanitarian catastrophe is unfolding before our eyes in the Central African 
Republic. The entire population is affected – and the number of people displaced 
in Bangui alone has increased by 130,000 in the space of only a few days (…)The 
international community, led by France, is mobilizing to address the spiral of 
violence that lies at the root of the humanitarian drama."173 
This statement is significant because it clearly acknowledges that France is one of the principal 
actors pushing for a decisive response to the conflict in the CAR. When stating that “The 
international community, led by France, is mobilizing to address the spiral of violence”, France is 
given a prominent role in the EU’s security provision in the CAR. Again, the referent object, “The 
entire population” in the CAR is mentioned, and it is emphasised that an air operation is launched 
to deter the “humanitarian catastrophe” in the country. 
At a meeting in the Council on Foreign Affairs on December 16th 2013, the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, appealed for help with the French military operation, Operation 
Sangaris, which was launched in the CAR on December 6th 2013 after the Security Council’s 
adoption of Resolution 2127 (2013). Fabius asked for more logistical support and for the member 
states of the EU to contribute troops assisting the 1.600 French soldiers already deployed.174 In this 
way, at this point in time where the EU has not yet deployed its own military operation in the CAR, 
France had a different approach to deterring the conflict. Where the EU is still, even though the EU 
had previously expressed that it considered suspending its normal policies towards the CAR, 
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focused on providing security through humanitarian assistance, France has a more military focus in 
its response to the conflict. 
One can argue that France’s push for a strong response from the EU to the conflict in the CAR, and 
subsequently its intervention in the country, has been informed by its historical legacy of 
colonialism.175 No other European country has sent troops to Africa as regularly as France has – 
almost every year has seen France launching an operation in Africa. Operation Sangaris marks the 
39th African mission launched by France since all the former French colonies were granted 
independence in 1960.176   
Another explanation for France’s push for a strong response from the EU to the conflict in the CAR, 
can be found in Frances inadequate reaction to the genocide in Rwanda, a former colony, in 
1994.177 Fear among French diplomats was that without intervening in the CAR, the international 
community could potentially have another failed state on its plate, where extremist groups fester 
and restrain an already volatile region.178 In relation to the conflict in CAR, Fabius, was quoted 
saying, "It is total disorder (…). We must act quickly."179 In addition, Bernard Kouchner, co-
founder of Doctors Without Borders and former Foreign Minister under former French President 
Sarkozy, stressed the importance of ‘the right to humanitarian intervention’.180 Kouchner witnessed 
first-hand how 800,000 people were killed in less than 100 days during the Rwandan genocide in 
1994, and adds that“…we cannot allow that” in relation to the CAR.181 He maintained that France 
had learned from its mistakes, and stressed how not only human rights and human lives are at stake 
but also the security “…for all of us”.182 In this way, France has a different approach than the EU to 
conflicts on the African continent, which might explain why they at this point pushed for a strong 
response from the EU to the conflict in the CAR. When Kouchner talks of security “…for all of us” 
he establishes a double purpose183 for the securitization of the conflict in the CAR. In his eyes, the 
concern of the EU is not only human security of the people in the CAR, but also the security of the 
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EU. In this way, the “…objects of security lie both inside and outside the EU, and embrace both 
states and individual.”184 
From the above mentioned speech acts from prominent actors, it becomes apparent that the referent 
object is the population of the CAR. The human security of the population in the CAR is at the 
centre of every statement concerning the EU’s involvement in the current conflict in the CAR, and 
the EU establishes itself as a security provider in the CAR. 
In the following, we will proceed to determine what constitutes the existential threat. The above 
reference to the fear of the conflict spiralling out of control and affecting the region might already 
provide a partial answer to this question. One aspect of the existential threat, which we can already 
determine, is the concern for the large-scale loss of life, human rights abuses and crimes against 
humanity. However, if these concerns warrant the suspension of “normal” policies, the provision of 
security by providing humanitarian assistance remains to be investigated. We have now established 
that the EU has been involved in the CAR well before the current conflict erupted, and that the 
EU’s initial response to the conflict was to increase humanitarian aid and monitor the situation – no 
mention was made of intervening with military means. It has further been established that France 
intervened militarily as an early response to the conflict, while at the same time pushing the EU for 
a similar response. The question thus remains – what has made the EU diverge from the initial 
response to the conflict with humanitarian aid and assistance, and subsequently intervene with 
military means? This question will be explored in the following. 
 
4.1.5 An impeding military operation?  
On January 20th 2014, the EU’s position on the CAR changed considerably. This is  expressed 
through the following conclusions from a meeting of the Council of the European Union. It is 
established that the Council remains  
“…deeply concerned by the extreme insecurity and instability in the Central 
African Republic.”185  
A new and interesting development is, however, that the Council acknowledges  
“the importance of (…) stepping up EU involvement in the CAR as part of its 
overall approach, wishes to thank the High Representative for the proposal she 
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has put forward to ensure that the EU plays an active part in helping to stabilize 
CAR under the CSDP. The Council reached political agreement on a future 
CSDP military operation and, to that end, approved the Crisis Management 
Concept.”186  
This is a significant development in the EU’s position towards the CAR, and illustrates for the first 
time that the EU is willing to suspend its “normal” policy, that of humanitarian assistance, in order 
to halt the crisis. From the Council Conclusions from January 20th 2014 it becomes apparent that a 
motivating factor for the EU to change its policy towards the CAR, and embracing future a military 
intervention, is due to its: “…concern about the risk of the Central African conflict having an effect 
on the neighbouring countries.”187  
On January 31st 2014, the EU announced that it would renew its support for security and elections 
in the CAR. The Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs, was noted saying:  
“…this new funding will bring the EU’s total commitments to the Central African 
Republic since the beginning of the crisis to around 200 million – a clear 
indication that we are mobilising all available resources, not just development 
aid, to help the people of the Central African Republic and improve their security, 
in a situation that has been getting worse for more than a year now.”188  
It is worth taking note of this because it shows how, even though the EU at this point has 
announced a military operation, the EU does not deviate from its initial response to the conflict, 
which was an increase in humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, this statement shows that the EU 
links security and development aid in order to deal with the conflict in the CAR, and that the EU 
sees itself as a security provider in the CAR – both by military means and by humanitarian 
assistance. This aligns with the broader definition of security provision utilised in this project as 
described in the chapter on military interventions and the EU as a security provider. 
 
In a speech to the European Parliament on February 5th 2014, the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Evangelos Venizelos, held a speech on Europe’s role in the 
CAR. Here, the concern for the CAR was reiterated, and the need to protect the population was 
underlined. Venizelos remarked that: “The country continues to experience a major crisis: 
insecurity is widespread as are human rights violations, and the humanitarian situation is 
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alarming.”189 Further, Venizelos pointed out that“…we are now facing not a failed state but a 
vacuum where a state no longer exists.”190 This statement encapsulates the existential threat: the 
concern for large-scale loss of life and “human rights violations”, as well as another failed state in 
the Central African region, which is a problem for the EU in that it could potentially destabilize the 
region, as highlighted in previous statements, with flows of refugees entering the neighbouring 
countries. A destabilized region could develop into a hot bed for radical extremists and terrorists, 
and could potentially pose a threat to Europe.  
Although at this point the EU set out on a more decisive path in regards to handling the conflict in 
CAR, Venizelos stressed that  
“The EU has responded swiftly and comprehensively to address the current 
crisis, in full support of the French intervention. Its response (…) is a testimonial 
to the EU ability to quickly and adequately respond to the severe crisis with all of 
the instruments at its disposal.”191  
In this statement, the EU’s inadequate response to the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia looms large, and 
one could argue that Venizelos with this statement tries to portray that the EU has learnt its lesson 
along with having gained more capabilities in order to act decisively in times of crisis.192 
Furthermore, from this statement it becomes apparent that the conflict in the CAR is constructed as 
a crisis that the EU has to deal with – quickly and adequately. The EU establishes itself as a security 
provider who has “responded swiftly and comprehensively” to the conflict.  
In line with this, Venizelos notes:  
“Given the urgent priority of re-establishing a secure environment, the EU 
Foreign Affairs Council took a political decision on 20 January to begin 
preparations for an EU military operation in the Central African Republic. The 
decision was taken in the context of the continued state of lawlessness and 
physical insecurity throughout much of the country, and the common desire to 
reinforce the security situation so that urgently needed humanitarian support can 
be delivered to those that need it.”193  
This statement illustrates that the EU at this point is closer to suspend its normal policies towards 
the CAR. A “common desire to reinforce the security situation” and an “urgently needed 
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humanitarian support” justified these considerations to suspend the EU’s normal policies, and at 
the same time establishes the EU as a security provider in the CAR,  
 
Following Venizelos’ speech to the European Parliament, the Commission issued a memo on 
February 10th 2014. The Commission memo establishes the EU military operation, which the UN 
Security Council resolution 2134 (2014) was the legal basis for, based on the Foreign Affairs 
Council’s political agreement from January 20th 2014 mentioned above: 194   
“…following the adaption of the UNSC resolution, and convinced of the need to 
support African efforts in the CAR and to reinforce European involvement there 
within the framework of its comprehensive approach by means of active EU 
contribution to the stabilization of the CAR as part of the CSDP, the Council has 
decided to establish a CSDP-EUFOR CAR military operation.”195 
It is here clearly established that the extraordinary measures is a military intervention in the CAR. 
The EU here establishes a suspension of its normal policies towards the CAR; the EU wishes to 
“reinforce European involvement” by an “active EU contribution” to deter the conflict in the CAR. 
 
At the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on March 17th 2014, it reaffirmed its concerns, which it 
expressed at the previous Council conclusions from January 20th and February 10th 2014: 
“The security and humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
remains a matter of deep concern, despite the relative stabilisation of the 
situation in Bangui and in the areas in which international forces are deployed. 
(…) It remains concerned about the risk of the Central African conflict having an 
effect on the neighbouring countries (…).”196  
Furthermore, the Council noted that:  
“The EU is particularly concerned about the security threats to the civil 
population and about the consequences, in particular humanitarian, of mass 
forced departures of Central Africans and migrants (…) mainly towards Chad, 
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the 
Congo.”197  
                                                          
194 European Commission (Brussels, February 10th 2014) memo 
195 Council of the European Union (Brussels, February 10th 2014) press release: 3291st Council Meeting Foreign 
Affairs 
196 Council of the European Union (Brussels, March 17th, 2014) ”Council conclusions on the Central African Republic” 
 
197 The Council of the European Union (Brussels, March 17th 2014). 
44 
 
In this regard, Catherine Ashton furthermore expressed her concern for the  
“The situation in the Central African Republic presents a growing risk (…) to the 
stability of the Central African Region. The international community must act 
swiftly to prevent further bloodshed in the Central African Republic. The 
European Union intends to take part in these efforts to bring back stability and 
security in Bangui and the rest of the country.”198 
These statements all paint a picture of an EU that was very much concerned by the potential 
destabilization of the Central African Region. It is established that the EU remains “concerned 
about the risk of the Central African conflict having an effect on the neighbouring countries”, and 
the “mass forced departures of Central Africans and migrants”. Essentially, the EU is afraid that 
the “large number of refugees heading to neighbouring countries” could potentially destabilise the 
region, the EU confirms its role as security provider committed to “back stability and security”. 
Agostino Miozzo, Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Cooperation at the 
European External Action Service, was quoted saying, “The Mediterranean Sea is a river and 
Libya is our neighbour. Do we need another 9/11 to boost the system and move faster?” at a Policy 
Dialog hosted by the European Policy Centre in Brussels on November 21st 2013, implying that the 
concern for a destabilizing Central African Region was justified.199 
 
4.1.6 Chapter conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, we have looked back on how the EU’s position to the current conflict in 
the CAR developed. By analysing different speech acts from different securitizing actors, we have 
been able to identify how the conflict in the CAR has evolved from being considered a condition to 
being a problem in an EU context.  
The objective of this analysis was to reach an understanding of why the EU decided to intervene 
militarily in the CAR, and how the conflict in the CAR moved onto the agenda within the EU.  In 
order to understand the EU’s position on the CAR, we structured our analysis after the three 
concepts referent object, existential threat and extraordinary measures. The population of the CAR 
was identified as the referent object because they are subject to violence, crimes against humanity 
and human rights abuses on a daily basis. The existential threat turned out to be twofold; crimes 
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against humanity and human rights abuses are one part of the existential threat, whereas the other 
part is the increased exodus of Central Africans towards neighbouring countries, potentially leading 
to a destabilization of the entire region. The extraordinary measure that the EU has employed to 
combat the conflict came to be the launch of a military operation with a humanitarian justification. 
Put shortly, it can be said that the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR in order to protect 
the referent object, the population in the CAR, from the existential threat, the destabilisation of the 
Central African Region and the reoccurring abuse of human rights, by the use of extraordinary 
measures, a military intervention with reference to humanitarian concerns. 
The identification of these three factors led us to the conclusion that there has been a shift in the 
EU’s position towards the CAR. Initially the EU responded to the conflict by simply increasing its 
humanitarian presence and aid. However, since the EU has been present in the CAR long before the 
current conflict erupted, this did not constitute a new response to the CAR. However, with the 
decision to intervene with extraordinary measures, a military intervention, the EU deviated from 
and suspended its “normal” policy towards the CAR, which had so far focused on delivering 
humanitarian aid. Therefore, when the EU decided to provide security by military means instead of 
humanitarian assistance, it is a suspension of its normal policies towards the CAR. 
To conclude, by identifying the referent object, the existential threat and the extraordinary measure, 
the problem stream has provided us with an answer to why the EU decided to intervene in the CAR. 
The analysis in the problem stream followed a typical securitization framework. However, as our 
intention with this project is to utilise a new combination of methods, it is not enough to understand 
how the EU has constructed the conflict in the CAR as a security problem. We need the following 
analysis to grasp fully why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR. The following 
analysis, structured around the policy stream and the politics stream, will give us the ability to 
discover other aspects as to why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR than a classical 
securitization framework provides.  
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4.2 Policy Stream 
4.2.1 Introduction 
As explained in the theoretical chapter, the policy stream focuses on how policy communities play a 
role in the formulation of policies, and how a problem becomes a policy. Therefore, the overall 
purpose of this chapter is to investigate the policy community within the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), and consequently how the composition of the policy community influences 
the formulation of policies in the CDSP. As described in the chapter on the development of military 
interventions and EU as a security provider, Drent (2013) argues that the institutional architecture is 
important because it is what makes actions possible. This is also true within the policy stream, 
within which it is important to look at what is technically feasible and acceptable to do in regards to 
a certain policy problem. This chapter will therefore begin with an introduction to the scope of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the CSDP. Consequently, when investigating 
why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR, the institutional framework is important to 
identify because this explains the limits of the EU’s external actions.  
The identification of the policy community within the institutional framework of the CSDP is 
argued to be relevant when investigating the role of the EU as a security provider outside the EU. 
The work of the Political Security Committee (PSC) is seen as promoting “…a supranational 
culture”200 within the policy formulation of the CSDP. As will be argued in the chapter, the PSC is 
to be seen as an integral part of the policy community within the CSDP. Consequently, we argue 
that the policy community plays a crucial role in regards to the work of the EU as a security 
provider outside the EU.  
Officially all decisions within the CSDP are taken by either by the Foreign Ministers or the Heads 
of States or Governments. However, scholars are beginning to view the process as being far more 
complex.201Although it is widely recognised that the CSDP is intergovernmental202, this chapter 
will argue that due to the consensus-seeking approach of the PSC, which is at the core of the policy 
community, it is possible to say that an “EU-approach” to conflicts has been developed. In effect, 
the decision-making process within the CSDP is not solely conditioned by national interests 
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because specialists within the PSC have the power to shape CSDP policies. Conversely, recognizing 
that Ambassadors within the PSC represent the interest of their national governments, they are also 
working towards achieving a common position, even though it might result in a deviation from the 
original interest of their national governments. In this way, the EU can be seen as a security 
provider outside the EU in its own right.  
The institutional development of the CFSP and CSDP, especially since the late 1990s, made it 
technically possible for the EU to launch a military intervention in the CAR in the spring of 2014. 
Especially the PSC can be seen as an integral part of the policy community within the framework of 
the CSDP, and the PSC are seen as being able to shape policies and operates as a bureaucracy. Due 
to their specialised knowledge within the policy area of CDSP, they are able to exercise power over 
other political actors, e.g. the Foreign Ministers of the member states. Because of the authority and 
autonomy of the policy community, the institutions and bodies who are a part of the community are 
seen as important actors within the policy-stream. 
The findings of this project rests well with Balzacq’s notion of the securitizing actor’s ability to 
create a successful securitization process. Due to the securitizing actor’s, often, superior power 
position and knowledge compared to the audience. According to Balzacq, “… securitization 
dynamics are power-laden”203. In the securitizing situation, there is therefore a “power-struggle”204 
where the securitizing actor aims at convincing the audience of an eminent threat. Balzacq aligns 
the power of the securitizing actor with Bourdieu’s notion of “capital”:”…the power to persuade 
rests with the assumption that a given securitizing actor knows what is going on, and works for a 
common interest. Here, knowledge (a kind of cultural capital), trust and the power position 
(political or symbolic capital) are linked.”205 This resonates with Barnett and Finnemore’s notion of 
the source of bureaucratic power. For them, bureaucracies’ ability to “... classify objects, to shift 
their very meaning and identity, is one of bureaucracies greats sources of power”206. Likewise, 
“Naming and labelling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of 
acceptable action”207.  The PSC is in this project seen as having bureaucratic power because they 
has the power to shape policies as a consequence of their role as the main policy formulating 
policies within the CSDP.   
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4.2.2 Institutional framework of the CFSP and CSDP 
The following will be both a historical introduction to the development of the CFSP, as well as an 
introduction to the institutional framework within which both the CFSP and the CSDP exist.  This is 
done in order for this project to identify which main institutions within the CFSP and CSDP are 
responsible for the actual formulation of policies, and who can consequently be seen as constituting 
the policy community in the process of the formulation of the policy towards the CAR.  
The policy community of the CSDP is by this project identified as consisting of the PSC as the 
main actor, who collects information from specialised actors, such as the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) within 
different areas of the CSDP. The PSC shapes and determines the fate of the different proposed 
policies, by formulating one combined policy and forwarding it to the Council.208 See figure 3 for 
an overview of the workings of the PSC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
208 “Political and Security Committee (PSC)” Summaries of EU legislation http://europa.eu  
Figure 3 - Structure of the Political and Security Committee 
49 
 
The EU is neither to be seen as a state nor as an international organisation, but rather as a 
“…complex multilevel system.”209 This has influences the institutional framework of the CFSP and 
CSDP. The development of the institutional framework of a common foreign policy was on the 
agenda from the beginning of the EU itself, but during the 1950s and 1960s the development was 
halted due to a difference in opinion regarding the means and ends of a European foreign policy.210 
In 1970, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established, however it was decided that 
security issues and defence matters were not to be discussed within the EPC framework.211 With the 
Maastricht Treaty the CFSP replaced the EPC within the new institutional framework of the 
European Union212 and security issues were officially a part of the institutional framework of the 
European Union.   
The Maastricht Treaty defined five key objectives of the CFSP:213 
1. To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence, and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
2. To strengthen the security of the Union; 
3. To preserve peace and to strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles 
of the United Nations Charter (including those on external borders); 
4. To promote international cooperation; and 
5. To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
During the 1990s, the CFSP developed further, and the need for European defence cooperation 
developed, which in March of 2000 resulted in the establishment of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP was “composed of three elements: military crisis management, 
civilian crisis management; and conflict prevention”214 and it was developed further during the 
European Council meetings between 1999 and 2001 (Cologne, Helsinki and Feira). Most notably 
was the development of the Petersberg Tasks, which is defined in the Petersberg Declaration as the 
“…readiness of member governments to make available a wide range of conventional military 
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forces for European-led military tasks.”215 The Petersberg Declaration is therefore an important 
document when it comes to the technical feasibility of a military intervention by the EU. Another 
addition to the ESDP was the ´headline goals´ for the EU, which meant that the EU should be able 
to deploy 60.000 troops in sixty days, and the deployment should be able to be sustained for up to a 
year.216 The headline goals are also seen as being part of what makes a EU military intervention 
technically feasible.  
The Nice Treaty among other things established the PSC, whose main role is to keep track of 
international situations and to help prepare and define policies within the CFSP for the Council.217 
The Nice Treaty also introduced the European Union Military Committee (UEMC)218 and the 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).219 Both the UEMC and the 
CIVCOM receives guidance from the PSC, and in return advise the PSC in their work.220 These 
three committees should therefore be seen as the main actors in the policy community when it 
comes to formulating policies in relation to an EU military intervention, especially due to the 
extensive role of the PSC in the formulation of policies within the CFSP and the CDSP.221  
With the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP was redefined as the CSDP.222 One of the aims of the Lisbon 
Treaty was to “…develop further the EU’s involvement in security issues.”223 Article 18 of the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) created role of the High Representative who also is to serve as 
the vice-president of the Commission.224 The role of the High Representative is to ensure “…the 
consistency of the EU’s external actions”225, and he/she is assisted by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS).226 The formal role of the EEAS is to “…coordinate the EU’s external action by 
supporting the High Representative in conducting and implementing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).”227 Both the 
High Representative and the EEAS can be seen as being part of the policy community, especially 
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EEAS due to their role as the “…principal agency in the field of crisis management.”228 The Crisis 
Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is part of the EEAS229 and under the overall 
authority of the High Representative230, are responsible for drafting a Crisis Management Concept 
(CMC). The CMC is “…the conceptual framework describing the overall approach of the EU to the 
management of a particular crisis.”231 The High Representative and EEAS can through the work of 
the CMPD therefore be seen as part of the policy community, although perhaps more indirectly than 
directly due to the fact that they are not themselves openly drafting the CMC.  
 
4.2.3 The formulation of policies within the CFSP 
After having introduced the main actors within the policy community, this section will be an 
introduction to the actual process of formulating a policy within the framework of the CSDP. Since 
this project is focusing on the securitization of the military intervention in the CAR in the spring of 
2014, it is only concentrated on how a policy regarding a military CSDP mission is formulated. The 
main argument within this chapter is that the policy community is central to the formulation of 
policies, and that they are able to shape the policies of the CSDP, which can be related to the power 
of bureaucracies – as introduced in the beginning of this chapter. The PSC is seen as the main actor 
within the policy community of the CSDP, however other specialists are also relevant when 
discussing the policy formulation process within CSDP, such as the EUMC and CIVCOM.  
Article 24 TEU states that the European Council and the Council, acting unanimously, are 
responsible for the development and implementation of the CFSP.232 The Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC), which consists of the Foreign Affairs ministers of the Member States, are responsible for the 
consistency of the policies within the CFSP.233 The Council adopts the CMC, giving it “the highest 
level of political approval”234, but “since it is rare that the Council will reopen issues that have 
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already been approved by the PSC”235 neither the European Council nor the Council are identified 
as being a members of the policy community. This is due to the fact that the European Council does 
not play a significant role in the actual formulation of the CMC; rather, the formulation of the CMC 
happens within the policy community of the CSDP, in which the CMPD are responsible for 
formulating the CMC. As described previously, the CMC is the overall approach to a specific crisis, 
and it “…is a multi-pillar document.”236 The PSC also play a role in this part of the policy 
formulation due to the fact that they have the “political control and strategic direction of the 
CMPD”237, and before the CMC is forwarded to the Council, the PSC have to agree on the CMC.238 
When the CMC has been approved, the next step in the policy formulation is the consideration of 
the strategic options, which are “the general outlines of actions designed to achieve the political 
objectives outlined in the CMC.”239 The PSC will ask EU Military Staff, which is under the 
direction of the EUMC240, for Military Strategic Opinions (MSO) and the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability (CPCC) for Political Strategic Options (PSO) or Civilian Strategic Options 
(CSO).241 The CIVCOM and EUMC then comment on the different strategic options, “...after 
which the PSC drafts a decision on the various options”242 where it is decided between the different 
options proposed by the EUMC and CIVCOM, after which the Council can take the decision to 
act.243 Here it is clear that the PSC, CIVCOM and EUMC work as specialists deciding the fate of 
policy proposals. 
Based on the proposal from the PSC, a Council Decision (CD) is formulated and then approved by 
the Council; this is the “legal act by which the Council formally establishes the operation.”244 It is 
clear that the work of the PSC, CIVCOM and EUMC is essential for the drafting of the CD, and this 
is yet another sign of the importance of those committees in the formulation of policies.  
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After this stage, the civilian and military CSDP missions diverge245, and because this project is 
dealing with the military intervention in the CAR, the focus will be on the further development in 
regards to a military mission. This third step in the policy formulation is where the strategy 
becomes increasingly detailed, with an initiating military directive (IMD), in which the EUMC 
“…translates the CD into military guidance for the Operation Commander.”246 Hereafter the further 
development of the operation is described in new documents: The Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS), which is the a statement of how the Operation Commander will fulfil the mission and 
the Operation Plan (OPLAN), which is the script of the operation in its entirety. The IMD, 
CONOPS and OPLAN all have to be accepted by the PSC before they are forwarded to the 
Council.247 Alongside the CONOPS, a Statement of Requirements (SOR) is drafted; it is the 
document that describes the means and resources that are deemed necessary for the mission to be 
successful.248 Once all of these documents have been adopted, and the SOR has been fulfilled, the 
Council can officially launch the operation.  
The main conclusion from this is that the PSC can be seen as the linchpin249 of the CSDP, and it 
consequently constitutes the backbone of the policy community within the CSDP. Other actors such 
as the EUMC and CIVCOM also play important roles when guiding the PSC in civilian and 
military aspects of a policy. However, the PSC is deemed to be the most important actor when it 
comes to the formulation of policies; the PSC is the actor deciding the fate of different policy 
proposals by gathering information from other specialists within the CSDP.  
 
4.2.4 The Power of the Policy Community 
As described in the theoretical chapter, the audience who needs to be persuaded within the policy 
communities are the specialists and technocrats who constitute the policy communities. It is 
therefore interesting to investigate how the PSC actually reaches decisions within the committee 
itself.  
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Howorth (2011) argues that Christoph Meyer was the first to analyse the workings of the PSC in his 
book “The Quest for a European Strategic Culture- Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the 
European Union” from 2006. In his book, Meyer “…detected a consensus-seeking discursive 
approach which results in even envoys from major countries shifting their initial stance in the 
greater course of forging an EU policy.”250 As seen in figure 3, the PSC is constituted by, among 
other, one Ambassador per Member State. However, the findings of Meyer show that the 
Ambassadors have a consensus-seeking approach to the policy formulation. This correlates well 
with Kingdon’s notion of policy formulation in which specialists can be persuaded to act against 
their initial goals. 
The PSC therefore not only formulate but also shape policies. This is also seen in Meyer’s 
conclusion where he states that the PSC “has developed into a multiplier of social influence, both 
through informal influence as well as peer pressure. It has managed to manufacture consent and 
broker compromises even in areas where national strategic norms would initially indicate 
incompatibility.”251 This is also an example of how the specialists within the policy community 
reach common ground, as proposed by Kingdon.  
Both Juncos & Reynolds (2007) and Howorth (2010) base their investigations of the PSC on 
interviews with representatives of the committee. Juncos & Reynolds (2007) find that the PSC 
Ambassadors are not sent to Brussels to “…bargain over fixed, exogenously formed national 
preferences”252 but rather there is a wish from the Member States to develop the PSC into a strong 
specialised committee in the area of security, defence and foreign policy.253 Juncos & Reynolds 
(2007) are also positive towards the idea that the PSC can shape the policies of Member States, 
which is suggested by Barnett & Finnemore (1999) as being the power of bureaucracies, by arguing 
that “…routine interaction can make a difference, both to the representative themselves and to the 
actual substance of national foreign and security policies.”254 This statement can also be seen as an 
example of what Kingdon argues in his theory of the policy stream, where he states that specialists 
can be persuaded by other specialists.  
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Howorth (2010) argues that “…a supranational culture is emerging from a intergovernmental 
process”255 because of the “…normative socialisation process which inform the work of the 
PSC.”256 The fact that he sees the PSC as contributing to the development of a supranational culture 
is another argument for the power of the PSC when shaping policies within the CSDP because it 
shows the move away from the national preferences. Howorth (2011) argues that his findings 
“…reveal an unanimous sense that, above all, the Committee seeks to achieve consensus.”257 Again, 
this wish to reach a consensus when formulating policies is an example of the willingness of the 
specialists within the PSC to change their original stance on a matter if persuaded. Howorth (2011) 
defines the PSC as the “…script-writer for the CSDP narrative”258 which not only justifies the 
chosen focus in this project on the PSC, but also correlates well with Kingdon’s notion of the policy 
communities, where the specialists within that area have the power to define policies. Howorth 
(2011) argues that although being under the control of the national Foreign Ministers, the PSC 
Ambassadors have the power to “…influence the thinking and opinion both at home and in 
Brussels.”259 This supports the argument that the PSC holds bureaucratic power, as defined by 
Barnett and Finnemore, because the Committee can shape policies within the CSDP. 
The presented arguments of Meyer, Juncos & Reynolds, and Howorth therefore supports Kingdon’s 
notions of the policy stream where he proposes that specialists are an audience who are capable of 
being persuaded by arguments based on knowledge, and consequently able to move away from 
initial national preferences within a given policy area. One can also clearly see the link to Barnett 
and Finnemore and their argument that bureaucracies because of their specialised knowledge are 
able to shape the policies of national governments.  
 
Barnett and Finnemore, building on Weber and his study of bureaucratization, have argued that 
bureaucracies “…are technically superior to previous forms of rule because they bring precision, 
knowledge, and continuity to increasingly complex social tasks.”260 Bureaucracies are therefore, just 
as the policy community, based on knowledge and rationality and consists of specialists in a given 
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area.261 As Kingdon argues, specialists and technocrats are the ones who define the “…value 
acceptability for the policy community.”262 Barnett and Finnemore argue that bureaucracies as 
deploying “…socially recognized relevant knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will 
be pursued.”263 It is therefore possible to see a resemblance between Kingdon’s definition of policy 
communities and Barnett and Finnemore’s argument for the power of bureaucracies. Bureaucracies, 
or political communities, are deemed to be constituted of specialists within a given policy area, in 
this case the CSDP, and they have the autonomy within that policy area because of their 
“specialized technical knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately available to 
other actors.”264 This means that sometimes bureaucracies not only formulate but also shape 
policies because this specialised knowledge gives the bureaucracies power over political actors.265 
This power can also be seen within the policy communities as it is the specialists, or bureaucrats, 
within the specific policy areas who decide the fate of different policy proposals.   
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the institutional framework of the CFSP and CSDP in order to identify 
the actors playing a role in the policy formulation of CSDP operations. It has shown that the overall 
institutional framework, within which the decision to intervene militarily are decided, entails many 
different documents and actors, and it is therefore a complex matter to analyse the actual policy 
formation process.  
However, the PSC has been identified as the key actor in the formulation of policies within the 
framework of CSDP. The PSC gathers information from many different specialists, and on the basis 
of that the PSC drafts the policies, and forwards it to the Council, who rarely changes the policy 
before adopting it. It is established that the PSC hold bureaucratic power and is therefore able to not 
only formulate but also shape the policies in the area of CSDP. In essence, the PSC represents a 
supranational culture that enable the EU to have a unified approach to security provision outside the 
EU. Consequently, when utilising the policy stream to answer the problem formulation it becomes 
clear that the ability of the PSC to shape policies and the fact that the EU has an institutional 
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framework made it possible for the EU to decide to intervene militarily in the CAR. Therefore, the 
policy stream adds another nuance to the answer of the problem formulation.  
To further depend the analysis, it would have been ideal to incorporate the internal policy paper of 
the PSC in regards to the EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR. However, these policy 
documents are classified and consequently not possible to include in the analysis.  
 
In the following chapter, we will further depend our analysis of why the EU decided to intervene 
militarily in the CAR by utilising Kingdon’s politics stream.  
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4.3 Politics Stream 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In the following analysis, we will explore the most dominant attitudes in civil society266 in relation 
to the CSDP, and towards military interventions in general. This is done because the civil society as 
an audience in the securitization process creates the limits within which the decision-makers can 
formulate policies. Consequently, because the securitization is intersubjective, the success of the 
securitization process depends on the audience’s acceptance of a securitizing actors’ speech acts 
constructing an existential threat as threatening to a referent object.  Our main finding suggest that 
the dominant attitudes in civil society affected the EUs decision to intervene militarily in the CAR, 
because these attitudes define the acceptable limit within which the political elite can resolve a 
conflict.267 Core components of the politics stream include elements such as public mood, advocacy 
groups’ campaigns, and media coverage.268   
The main focus of the politics stream is identifying decision-makers “bargaining” behaviour and the 
building of ‘winning coalitions’.269 Kingdon (2011) points out that such ‘winning coalitions’ could 
be achieved by granting critical actors, who are not yet on board with a particular policy proposal, 
concessions. The policy proposal presented in the politics stream has usually been discussed in the 
policy stream after having been framed as a problem in the problem stream.  
Consequently, decision-makers who have not yet made a decision will need to be offered something 
in exchange for their support.270 In our case, the relevant audience, the Member States of the EU, 
need to be convinced that the situation in the CAR presents a security problem in the context of the 
EU, which they need to address by supporting a policy proposal that will alleviate the problem. 
Coalition building is an important aspect of the politics stream, and if decision-makers do not 
prioritize it properly, their policy proposal may not be adopted. When successful, coalition building 
can instigate a bandwagon effect where the more decision-makers support a policy proposal the 
more other decision-makers want to join in.271  
Although coalition building, as described, is an important part of any analysis of the politics stream, 
we will not be able to investigate it sufficiently due to practical and theoretical constraints. Our 
                                                          
266 We identify civil society as consisting of the citizens of the EU countries, NGO’s and the media.  
267 Manigart, P. (1986) ”Public Opinion on Defence Policy in the Countries of European Union”, p. 27. 
268 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011) p. 67. 
269 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011), p. 67. 
270 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011), p. 67. 
271 Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2011), p. 67. 
59 
 
theoretical framework only allows us to analyse and explore explicit ‘speech acts’ because the 
objective of this project is to explore how an issue is constructed as an existential threat to a referent 
object.272 By analysing explicit statements from securitizing actors we are able to understand how 
the conflict in the CAR has been constructed as an existential threat to a referent object.   
We will therefore not be able to establish in what way coalition building was instrumental in 
adopting the policy proposal to intervene militarily in the CAR. However, we are able to explore in 
what context that policy proposal was adopted. Investigating this context is central to understanding 
why the policy proposal was adopted because it informs us of certain circumstances that are present 
in civil society, which have created an environment where the adoption of such a policy is possible. 
Kingdon underlines this by ascertaining that the civil society is an important aspect of the politics 
stream, and may consequently have a significance in the adoption of a policy proposal. 
In order to structure our analysis we will identify the following; 
1. Attitudes towards the CFSP and CSDP, and military interventions by the EU in civil society. 
2. Member State’ positions on the CAR. 
We will especially focus on France, Germany and the UK in both analytical categories because they 
possess a significant actorness in matters regarding the CDSP.273 
By identifying these categories, we will be able to determine what attitudes in civil society may 
have had an impact on the decision to intervene with military means in the CAR, and how it has 
enabled the building of a common position on the CAR, and consequently enabled the EU’s 
decision to intervene militarily in the CAR.   
 
4.3.2 Coalition building and legitimacy  
When assessing how and why a policy proposal is adopted, one cannot disregard the role that 
legitimacy plays. The legitimacy of the EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR will rely 
on whether “a general conviction among a distinct majority of the international community that the 
use of armed force is correct and acceptable”274, which permeates the discourse surrounding the 
conflict. Legitimacy is therefore an accumulation of acceptance by various international actors and 
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may play a significant part in establishing a coalition in support of a policy proposal. Manigart 
(1986) points out that the publics’ perception of a given crisis usually defines the acceptable limits 
within which the political elite can resolve a conflict.275 Manigart (1986) argues that whereas the 
political leaders of the Cold War era probably had more manoeuvring space in matters of security 
and defence, civil society have become forces to be reckoned with in times of international crisis.276  
 
4.3.4 Attitudes towards intervention in the public, the media and in NGOs 
Military intervention was deemed quite unpopular during the 1980’s due to a confluence of factors 
e.g. experiences from the Cold War, colonialism, and the pacifist discourse permeating the Japanese 
and German societies.277 Public opinion gradually started to shift in favour of military intervention 
as a result of, for example, concerted international efforts aimed at restoring peace in the civil wars 
of Angola, Cambodia and El Salvador.278 The shift in civil society came about through a reciprocal 
process where intervention was spurred by the media, the public and NGO’s while at the same time 
new collective or state-led interventions convinced the public of their legitimacy.279   
A neo-interventionist attitude was especially prevalent in Western public opinion due to the 
proximity of the Yugoslavian conflict that saw numerous atrocities occur in Europe’s backyard and 
prompted a discourse of ‘responsibility’.280 Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg 
declared on behalf of the EC Presidency “This is the hour of Europe.”281 This correlates well with 
the findings in the chapter on the development of military interventions and the EU as a security 
provider outside the EU.  
The fact that atrocities were perpetrated in the West’s vicinity in the former Yugoslavia prompted 
many Europeans to support a more neo-interventionist attitude among policy-makers.282 However, 
this discourse of responsibility was quickly substituted by one of ‘tragic failure’.283 The EU’s 
inadequate response to the crisis in the Balkans prompted a fundamental shift in civil society’s 
opinion towards EU’s external relations, and the discourse went from being one of ‘passive 
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consensus’ to an expectation that values of EU should be defended outside the territorial boundaries 
of the EU.284 On the one hand, civil society demanded more assertive action during the 1990s in 
foreign conflicts with reference to morality, but civil society was generally reluctant to support wars 
that could potentially result in significant European casualties.285 A plausible reason explaining the 
failure to react properly to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia could be the European populations’ 
unwillingness to suffer casualties among nationals when responding to an international crisis, and 
policy-makers thus heeded civil society’s attitude too much. However, despite this apparent 
contradiction, the overall understanding of Western civil society is that it consistently supported 
interventionism throughout especially the 1990s with particular reference to humanitarian 
concerns.286 These attitudes in civil society towards military interventions based on humanitarian 
concerns aligns well with the findings of the chapter on the development of military interventions 
and the EU as a security provider outside the EU, especially in regards to the development of the 
R2P.  
In a study from 1999, Natalie La Balme showed that the French public favoured military 
involvement in Bosnia as early as 1992, and remained just as favourable to the idea of military 
intervention with reference to humanitarian concerns purposes throughout the 1990s.287 In regards 
to Operation Allied Force288, deployed in Kosovo, the French public proved to be hesitant at first, 
but approval ratings subsequently increased from 40 % at the end of March 1999 to 70 % in April 
the same year. Furthermore, a significant 60 % of the French public were supportive of involvement 
on the ground.289  
The British public has a reputation for consistently being among some of the most interventionist in 
Europe.290 Philip Towle investigated the pressure on the British government by the public “in 
favour of not only humanitarian aid to Bosnia, which the government and armed forces provided, 
but of military intervention to impose peace on the combatants.”291 Towle found that there was a 
significant dissonance between public opinion on the one side and the government and armed forces 
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on the other. The British government and the armed forces tried to stress the practical limitations of 
such an intervention, stressing that the “British government are going to have to work very hard to 
convince the public of the limitations on the abilities of outsiders to reduce the damage of wars (…). 
The public has to be persuaded that the decision to employ armed forces should be determined not 
only by the justice of the cause but also by their likely efficacy.”292 Towle’s statement illustrates that 
even though civil society may indicate a strong preference and acceptance of the use of armed 
force, and ultimately awarding a military intervention legitimacy, the population does not 
necessarily operate on the basis of complete information.  
Civil society’s opinion in Germany in regards to the use of armed force abroad has also shifted 
considerably since the reunification despite persistent differences in ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ 
Bundesländer.293 Especially during the crisis in Kosovo, a clear majority of the German public 
favoured a military intervention even if it meant the possibility of German casualties. If not for 
constitutional constraints, a more assertive Germany could have been a reality.294  
Describing the developments of attitudes in Germany, France and the UK gives us an impression of 
how attitudes towards military interventions and the use of armed force to deter international crisis 
has changed in general. By investigating these changes in attitudes towards the use of armed forces 
against sovereign states295, we infer that these changes have affected Germany’s, France’s and the 
UK’s position towards the use of military interventions with reference to humanitarian concerns. 
Additionally, studies have found that, generally speaking, public opinion today is more open to the 
idea of using armed force as a means for resolving international crisis.296 These claims can 
furthermore be substantiated by Eurobarometer surveys from the period 2003-2005. In the 
Eurobarometer surveys respondents were asked ‘do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each 
of the following statements’: 
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In 2003, 80.9 % of EU citizens were supportive of a more assertive EU when international crisis 
occurred. France and Germany were above the EU average with 83.7 % and 84.1 % respectively, 
while the UK was less supportive (71.1 %). It can be argued that the UK is under the EU average 
because the UK has a strong atlanticist-tradition and looks towards NATO in times of international 
Figure 4 – Eurobarometer 2003: Common position of the EU 
Figure 5 – Eurobarometer 2005: Common position of the EU  
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crisis.297 France on the other hand has always had strong aspirations for a deeper integration in 
matters of defence in the EU.298 In 2005, across all three countries citizens, citizens were even more 
supportive of a common EU position in matters relating to the use of armed force with 89 % 
agreeing in France and Germany and 78 % in the UK.  
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Figure 6 – Eurobarometer 2003: Guarantee human rights around the world 
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In 2003, 73.9 % of EU citizens shared this view. Especially the French respondents saw it as the 
EU’s prerogative to promote Human Rights abroad (78.6 %) followed by the Germans (72.5 %). 
Finally, well below the EU-average, 62. 3 % of Britons shared this view. Meanwhile, in 2005 across 
all four categories the number of respondents agreeing with the statement was up. In France, 88 % 
of respondents saw it as the EU’s prerogative to promote human rights abroad followed by 
Germany (80 %) and the UK with 76 %.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Eurobarometer 2003: Rapid military reaction  
Figure 6 – Eurobarometer 2005: Rapid military reaction 
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French respondents tended to agree strongly with this statement (75 %), followed by the UK with 
68 %. 63.3 % of German respondents tended to agree with this statement. The reason why Germany 
for once was below the EU average (68.7 %) can be explained by a prevalent pacifist discourse in 
German society and constitutional constraints in regards to the use of armed force.299 In 2005, there 
was a decrease in respondents tending to agree with the statement in Germany. However, a slight 
increase was visible in both France and the UK with 79 % and 71 % respectively.  
Overall, when analysing the data from the Eurobarometer surveys together it gives an understanding 
of how there generally is a strong support for EU military assertiveness in matters of crisis 
management with an emphasis on humanitarian assistance.  
These developments in populations’ attitudes towards military intervention has undoubtedly 
increased the perceived legitimacy of such interventions, and has also to a greater extent enabled 
Member States of the EU to support policy-proposals of a military nature.300 However, judging 
military interventions’ legitimacy by their degree of acceptance in the public is not a viable 
endeavour because of the susceptibility of public opinion. The publics’ attention span is rather 
restricted and tends to be invoked emotively and immediately from a current crisis, not to mention 
that public opinion can be manipulated.301  
Opinions of populations in regards to a crisis is usually based on limited and incomplete 
information whereas a government can draw on more in-depth knowledge in regards to a conflict.302 
Public opinion is an important indicator of legitimacy of a given intervention, because it establishes 
the limits within which the political decision makers can manoeuvre.303 However, the position of 
NGOs and media coverage needs to be considered, in order to show the full picture of civil 
society’s attitudes towards military interventions with reference to military interventions.  
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4.3.5 Media and NGOs influence on Military Interventions 
The media304  and public opinion are intricately linked, and it has been noted that the media has 
been instrumental in promoting a perception of military intervention with reference to humanitarian 
concern as legitimate.305 Especially television has been recognised as stimulating a turn towards a 
more positive stance towards military interventions with reference to humanitarian concerns.306 It is 
argued that throughout the 1980s, new technologies appeared to reduce “the scope for calm 
deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focused 
on.”307 Human catastrophes shown on television in people’s living rooms were bound to instigate 
public opinion and consequently government action.308 In general, the media has been instrumental 
in widening the perception of the legitimacy of military interventions during the 1990s.309 
Nevertheless, many observers have warned of the influence of the media in matters of foreign 
policy because the media more often than not possess incomplete knowledge of a situation, and may 
be prioritising one conflict over another of their coverage.310  
Closely tied to the media and the public opinion are NGO’s, which can play a significant role in 
affecting the publics attitudes towards military intervention. NGO’s opinions on whether or not to 
intervene with armed force are usually considered as authoritative because they possess a certain 
legal-rational capacity.311 Especially human rights organisations are organised around monitoring 
and documenting human rights abuses and could therefore be considered as credible experts when 
commenting on the scale of abuses potentially forcing governments to react.312 Additionally, 
NGO’s are tied to the media because they are frequent users of the media in order to get their views 
across to the public. Research suggests that NGO’s are able to influence the public because of their 
capacity as agenda setters and norm generators.313 Advocacy groups, such as Amnesty 
International, and organisations, such as Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross, have 
consistently worked towards raising awareness of humanitarian crisis, and have demanded public 
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attention and government involvement on numerous occasions.314 Although NGO’s possess 
extensive knowledge in regards to a given conflict, one has to keep in mind that NGO’s are interest 
organisation and their input in the public debate may thus be somewhat biased.315 NGO’s work on 
the ground in coordination with states and international organisations, and have thus direct access to 
conflicts and can therefore function as mediator for the different parties to a conflict.  
In relation to the CAR, Human Rights Watch, a prominent advocacy group and NGO, send a joint 
letter to the foreign ministers of the UN Security Council Member States asking for the 
authorisation of a peacekeeping mission in the CAR, in relation to the current conflict.316 Human 
Rights Watch asked specifically for the employment of armed force:   
“We write to urge you to use your seat on the UN Security Council to authorize 
without delay the deployment of a strong UN peacekeeping mission, as envisioned 
in the report UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon submitted on March 3, to 
protect civilians under attack in the Central African Republic (CAR).“317 
This is a significant declaration because most NGO’s tend to refrain from explicitly endorsing the 
use of armed force because it implies that more violence will have to perpetrated in order to prevent 
even greater human suffering.318 It is relevant to mention in this instance that Human Rights has a 
history of speaking out for military intervention in for example Bosnia, northern Iraq, Rwanda and 
Somalia.319  
To sum up, civil society is responsible for shaping an environment where the political decision to 
intervene with military means is either welcomed or disregarded, in that they set the boundaries for 
the action for the political decision makers in relation to military intervention in relation to 
humanitarian concern.     
  
4.3.6 Debates among Member States of the EU 
Besides the influence of the media, the public opinion and NGO’s in regards to questions of 
military intervention, internal debates within Member States also play an important role in 
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establishing an environment where the adoption of a policy proposal with a military character is 
possible. 
 
In the UK, defence sources declared that any EU operation with British participation would only 
resemble that of British involvement in Mali, where the French Operation Serval was supported by 
British RAF planes ferrying equipment into the country. It was explicitly stated that any ground 
involvement was out of the question – “Sending UK combat troops is not on the table.”320 This is in 
addition to the UK’s announcement that it will pledge £10 million in aid to the CAR.321 The UK 
already contributed with £5 million in July, and is thus considered one of the largest donors of 
humanitarian assistance to the CAR. In addition, it is concluded that the government “will continue 
to work alongside the International Red Cross and UN agencies to help thousands of people gain 
access to food, water, shelter, sanitation and healthcare to alleviate the desperate humanitarian 
suffering.”322 These two statements expresse how the UK is hesitant towards involving itself in the 
CAR by using armed force and remains focused on providing humanitarian assistance.  
Germany on the other hand, according to Chancellor Angela Merkel at an EU summit in Brussels 
late last year (2013), made it clear that Germany would neither provide troops nor financial support 
to an operation in the CAR, which the French had initiated.323 However, this position changed 
markedly, and by March 2014 the Minister for Defence Ursula von der Leyen proclaimed:  
“The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic is alarming. This 
makes it all the more important for the EU military operation to strengthen 
stability and security, so as to prevent violent conflict in the country from taking 
root and spreading. Rapid airlift of materiel and personnel is a key enabler. A 
lack thereof has so far prevented establishment of an EU military operation for 
the Central African Republic. I am very pleased that Germany can help solve this 
problem, without overstraining the Federal Armed Forces’ airlift capabilities in 
other operational areas, such as in connection with Afghanistan 
redeployment.”324  
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Taking note of this statement is important because it illustrates how the German Foreign Minister 
constructs the conflict in the CAR as a problem, which Germany and the EU should be concerned 
about. The Defence Minister emphasises that the conflict in the CAR “is alarming”, and the EU 
needs “to strengthen stability and security” and “prevent violent conflict (…) from taking root and 
spreading”.  
Additionally, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier declared:  
“We are prepared to support the planned EU military bridging operation in the 
Central African Republic. France, among others, has requested temporary 
assistance from European partners, so as to prevent state structures in the 
Central African Republic from collapsing entirely, and to achieve initial 
stabilisation. It is our shared European responsibility to pool all of the 
capabilities that are required for this.”325 
This is another declaration clearly indicating how Germany conceives of the crisis in the CAR as a 
problem, which needs to be handled. Steinmeier implies that a comprehensive approach to the 
conflict including a pooling of resources within the EU Member States is necessary in order to keep 
the conflict from spiraling out of control.  As a security provider, the EU needs to act “to prevent 
state structures (…) from collapsing entirely”, and consequently there is a need for the EU to “pool 
all of the capabilities” in order to deter the conflict in the CAR. 
France has since the overthrow of Bozizé in 2013 pushed for a common EU position on the conflict 
in the CAR, and has stressed the importance of rapid reaction.326 France’s strong reaction to the 
conflict in the CAR, and its willingness to use armed force, can be explained by the fact that, in 
many countries throughout the Central African Region small French regiments are present.327 
France has throughout the crisis maintained that such an acute situation like the one in the CAR 
could simply not wait for the lengthy decision-making process of the EU.328 Unlike its European 
counterparts, France does not shy away from the use of armed force, which has lead to accusations 
of ‘neo-colonialism’.329 This essentially means that international principles e.g. state sovereignty are 
not infallible – in certain respects the concern for human rights may trump the usual primacy of 
sovereignty.330  
                                                          
325 Auswärtigesamt.de (March 28th 2014) 
326 DW.de (January 21st, 2014) 
327 DW.de (January 21st, 2014) 
328 DW.de (January 21st, 2014) 
329 DW.de (January 21st, 2014) 
330 International Council on Human Rights Policy (2002), p.7. 
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German Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated that it is in Europe's own interest to restore order in 
the CAR, because "when instability, displacement and terrorism threaten Africa, the consequences 
will arrive in Europe."331 Steinmeier’s statement clearly expresses how it is in the EU’s interest to 
do something about the situation in the CAR because a potential ‘failed state’ could entail a mass 
exodus of Central Africans seeking refugee in neighboring countries potentially destabilizing these 
states and in turn result in heavier refugee flows towards the EU.  
Humanitarian policy adviser for the NGO Oxfam, Emma Fanning, is in charge of raising awareness 
of the CAR in the UK for Oxfam. Fanning insists that the UK has a vital role to play in the face of 
massive human suffering “the country is in freefall, and unless action is taken now there will be 
regional instability for years to come.”332 Similarly to the statements from Human Rights Watch, 
Fanning establishes that a decisive response to the situation in the CAR is necessary.   
As established throughout the analysis in this project, potential destabilisation of the Central 
African region is one of the most often-cited explanations as to why the Member States of the EU 
have adopted a policy proposal to intervene militarily in the CAR. According to Abdallah Wafy, 
deputy special commissioner for MONUSCO, the UN mission in the DRC evidence suggests that 
Seleka rebels are now to be found in the DRC Orientale province, which is in the close vicinity of 
the CAR.333  At the same time remnants of President Bozize’s army, who was overthrown by 
Djotodia in March 2013, have congregated in the DRC's Equateur province, which also borders on 
the CAR.334  
Finally, a memo on the crisis in the CAR from the American Congressional Research Center 
underlined how the “potential impact of the CAR crisis on regional stability is of concern to U.S. 
and other policymakers, particularly as conflicts in nearby countries, such as South Sudan and 
DRC, persist.”335 Furthermore it is noted in the memo how “refugee flows are taxing scarce local 
resources, while insecurity is hindering cross-border trade and the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
Neighboring states have limited capacity to respond. These dynamics could inflame local 
tensions”.336 
                                                          
331 DW.de (January 18th, 2014) “Germany's Bundeswehr may be expanding its commitments in Africa” www.dw.de  
332 The Guardian (April 4th 2014) “Twenty years after the genocide, we have learnt nothing from Rwanda” 
www.theguardian.com  
333 DW.de (January 14th 2014) ” Central African conflicts risk spreading”, www.dw.de  
334 DW.de (January 14th 2014) 
335 Arieff, A. (2014) ”Crisis in the Central African Republic” Congressional Research Servicep. 13. 
336 Arieff, A. (2014) p. 13.  
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4.3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
The above exploration of the overall context in which the decision to intervene in the CAR was 
taken, provides us with a partial answers to why the EU in the end chose not only to pursue a course 
of humanitarian assistance, but also to employ military measures in the response to the current 
conflict in the CAR.   
As established, civil society’s attitudes towards the EU’s utilisation of a military intervention with 
reference to humanitarian concerns, has changed since the 1990s. The Eurobarometer surveys 
established that the populations in the UK, France, Germany, and the EU overall proved to be 
favourable towards the deployment of EU troops in instances of humanitarian crisis. Subsequently, 
NGOs have utilised the media as an instrument to promote their position on the use of military 
measures in the response to humanitarian crisis.  
Consequently, these attitudes in civil society have created the acceptable limits within which the 
decision-makers can formulate policies in regards to military intervention with reference to 
humanitarian concerns. As established with the Eurobarometer surveys and the statements from 
several NGOs, consequently shows that the civil society’s attitude towards the use of military 
interventions with reference to humanitarian concerns has created an environment where it is 
acceptable to utilise military means in a response to a humanitarian crisis, such as the current 
conflict in the CAR. 
Therefore the politics stream provides us with a broader understanding of the context in which the 
EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR. Civil society attitudes towards military intervention 
with reference to humanitarian concerns has evolved in a more positive direction, and as an 
audience in a intersubjective securitization process, civil society’s attitudes influenced the EU’s 
decision to intervene militarily in the CAR.  
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5. Conclusion: The Policy Window 
Our aim with this project was to provide a comprehensive answer to our problem formulation “why 
did the EU decide to intervene militarily in the CAR during the spring of 2014?” Our theoretical 
point of departure was in a securitization framework. However, instead of structuring our analysis 
exclusively on securitization theory as described by the Copenhagen School we chose to 
incorporate Thierry Balzacq’s notions on securitization processes. To broaden the scope of our 
analysis and give a nuanced answer to our problem formulation, we operationalised our analysis 
after Kingdon’s “Three Stream Model”. Consequently, our analysis was structured around the three 
streams 1) problem stream, 2) policy stream, and 3) politics stream.  
The problem stream provided us with an answer as to how the conflict in the CAR has been 
problematized in the context of the EU. Through speech acts, the conflict in the CAR evolved from 
being perceived as a condition to being conceived of as a problem within the context of the EU. We 
identified the referent object as being the population of the CAR and the existential threat as being 
the large-scale loss of life, and the fear of the conflict spilling-over into neighbouring countries and 
destabilising the Central African Region. In order to respond to this existential threat the 
extraordinary measure was identified as being the launch of the EUFOR RCA military operation, 
and this constituted a suspension of the EU’s normal policy towards the CAR, which had previously 
been humanitarian assistance and development aid. Consequently, the analysis of the problem 
stream followed a conventional pattern within a securitization framework. The analysis of the 
policy and politics stream went further than the Copenhagen School in uncovering a securitization 
process.  
In the policy stream, we identified the PSC as being a decisive actor in the policy community within 
the CSDP, and consequently in the formulation of policies within the CSDP. The PSC held 
bureaucratic power, the ability to establish technical feasible measures, and due to its supranational 
culture, enabled a unified EU approach to the provision of security in the CAR by utilising military 
means. Thus, the institutional framework of the CSDP and CFSP plays a significant role in the 
EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR.  
The politics stream was an exploration of the context within which the EU’s decision to intervene 
militarily in the CAR was taken. By analysing Eurobarometer surveys and statements from NGO’s, 
we were able to establish that civil society’ attitudes towards utilising a military intervention with 
reference to humanitarian concerns has evolved in a more positive direction, and as an audience in a 
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intersubjective securitization process, civil society’s attitudes influenced the EU’s decision to 
intervene militarily in the CAR. Consequently, the politics stream provided us with a partial answer 
as to why the EU decided to intervene militarily in the CAR instead of only pursuing a course of 
humanitarian assistance. In addition, civil society’ attitudes have created the acceptable limits 
within which decision-makers are able to formulate policies in relation to intervening militarily with 
reference to humanitarian concerns.  
Consequently, the confluence of these three streams established a policy window where the 
adoption of the policy proposal to intervene militarily in the CAR was made possible. To conclude, 
the first part of our analysis established that the conflict in the CAR was moved from being a 
condition to being a problem in an EU context. The second part identified a policy community, 
where the PSC was the central actor, within which the policy in regards to the approach to the CAR 
was developed. Finally, the attitudes of civil society indicated the overall inclinations towards the 
EU and the provision of security abroad. Taken together these three streams provide us with a 
policy window within which the EU’s decision to intervene militarily in the CAR can be explained. 
Finally a few reflections on our use of Kingdon’s “Three Stream Model”. Operationalising our 
analysis by merging Kingdon’s “Three Stream Model” with a securitization framework was a fairly 
new endeavour. This created some initial complications, both in terms of finding sufficient 
empirical material, and in terms of distinguishing between and separating the objectives of the three 
different streams. However, utilising an extended method to operationalise our analysis gave us the 
possibility to tread new paths in utilising a securitization framework. Consequently, we were able to 
discover more than just how the conflict in the CAR was constructed as a problem necessitating an 
EU response.  
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